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Abstract
Food aid is an important tool to fight poverty and avert humanitarian crises in
developing countries. Although multiple studies on U.S. food aid have been carried out in the
past few decades, the answer to the question— what is the impact of food aid on agricultural
production— remains unclear. Many empirical studies focus on the household level, and their
results vary widely depending on the characteristics of the country as well as the time period
of interest. Our study, instead, uses country-level data in 118 recipient countries from
1961–2006. This paper examines the patterns of food aid allocation using a random effects
tobit model, and provides policy-makers causal evidence of the average effects of food aid on
food production. To address reverse causality between food aid and local production, we
adopt the instrumental variable method as the identification strategy. Specifically, we use a
three-way interaction term of U.S. wheat stocks, the dollar amount of U.S. military assistance
measured in logarithm, and a measurement of a country’s alliance with the U.S. as the
instrument for the endogenous variable food aid. In addition, we reconcile commodities in
production and food aid data to make sure that exactly same commodities are included in the
aggregate group. We find that U.S. food aid shipments are responsive to donor’s political
interests as well as recipient countries’ needs. U.S. cereal aid may negatively affect cereal
production in recipient countries. When the U.S. doubled food aid donations, production
would decrease by 1.5% on average, which means that an increase in the amount of U.S. food
aid by a mean value of 70,832 metric tons would result in an average reduction in production
of 173,952 metric tons. This disincentive effect of food aid on production is particularly
significant for Sub-Saharan African countries, low-income countries, and regular recipients of
U.S. food aid. However, food aid generates insignificant adverse impact on production when
food aid is used for humanitarian needs. The heterogeneous effects of food aid on production
are important for policy makers in order to evaluate and redesign the food aid programs.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Food aid is an important tool to fight poverty and avert humanitarian crises in developing
countries. The past fifty years have witnessed an increase in the prevalence of poverty in
developing countries as a result of frequent outbreaks of conflict, severe natural disasters, high
population growth, and slow or stagnant growth in domestic food production. In 2015, 795
million people lived in extreme poverty and were chronically undernourished (FAO, IFAD,
and WFP, 2015). Facing these humanitarian needs, international donors and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) provide food aid to improve the nutrition and food security of the poor.
According to a 2013 Congressional Research Service report (Hanrahan and Canada, 2013),
among the aid providers around the world, the United States contributed 56% of overall food
aid shipments during FY1996–2012, making its food aid program the most influential.
Given the significant role of the U.S. food aid program, it is important, especially for
policy makers, to evaluate the different aspects of impacts of food aid on recipient countries.
Researchers have studied the effects of food aid on economic growth (McClelland, 1998; Clay,
Riley, and Urey, 2005), domestic agricultural production (Schultz, 1960; Lavy, 1990; Barrett,
Mohapatra, and Snyder, 1999; Abdulai, Barrett, and Hoddinott, 2005; Kirwan and McMillan,
2007), balance of trade (Diven, 2001; Barrett and Maxwell, 2006) and food insecurity in
recipient countries (Dercon and Krishnan, 2003; Yamano, Alderman, and Christiaensen,
2005). In this paper, we are interested in examining the effects of food aid on food production.
We use food aid data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) over the period of
1961–2006 to explore the patterns of U.S. food aid allocation across recipient countries; we
then study the average impacts of food aid on food aid production in 118 recipient countries.
Although studies on U.S. food aid have been done for years, no conclusive answer has
been reached regarding the impacts of food aid on domestic agricultural production. Food aid
has been hypothesized to have disincentive, neutral, or positive effects on domestic
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production. Specifically, Schultz (1960) proposed a disincentive effect of food aid on
agricultural production since food aid acts as an addition to local food supplies, which could
lead to a fall in food price and a depression in the food market. Srinivasan (1989), however,
came up with a new hypothesis, stating that there might be a neutral effect of food aid on food
production. The adverse effect of food aid is not observable when food aid displaces
commercial imports and leaves the level of food supplies unchanged. In 1988, Maxwell and
Singer found a positive effect of food aid on production. Countries with an abundance of food
aid could reduce food imports and use saved money to import other agricultural resources
such as fertilizers, which could lead to an increase in the level of production.
Many things account for the conflicting results, including different methods, data
quality, and time span. A commonly used method in the previous literature is vector
auto-regression (VAR) analysis. VAR can capture the dynamic relationships between food aid
and production because each variable in a particular year depends on its own past values as
well as the lagged values of the other variable. However, VAR fails to reveal causality. In
addition, most studies use market-level data in a particular country. Although market-level
data can account for market-specific characteristics, the interpretation of the results is
restricted to the local market only, with no generalizability.
The major contribution of this paper is its use of an instrumental variable method as the
identification strategy to study the causal effect of food aid on production. One difficulty in
studying causality is reserve causality between food aid and production. To address the issue,
we instrument food aid receipts with a three-way interaction term of U.S. wheat stocks, U.S.
military assistance, and a measurement of a country’s alliance with the U.S. through its voting
pattern in the U.N. This instrument significantly captures the variations in the food aid variable,
and the identification strategy provides unbiased and consistent estimates.
The other contribution of this paper is its reconciliation of the commodities in FAO
production data with USDA food aid data to make sure that close substitutes are included at
each aggregation level, that is to say that cereals in production and food aid data contain the
same types of grains. This allows us to provide more precise estimations of the impacts. Very
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few studies attempt to make production and food aid data comparable, and thus our
reclassification approach provides a new angle from which to process production and food aid
data for future studies.
As for the main findings, we find that U.S. cereal aid reduces cereal production in
recipient countries. If the U.S. doubled food aid, production in recipient countries would
reduce by 1.5% on average. To put it another way, when the U.S. increased the amount of
food aid by a mean value of 70,832 metric tons, the average reduction in production in
developing countries would be around 173,952 metric tons. This disincentive effect of food
aid on production is particularly significant for Sub-Saharan African countries, low-income
countries, and regular recipient countries of U.S. food aid. However, food aid generates
insignificant adverse impact on production when food aid is used for humanitarian needs. In
addition, we find that food aid shipments are responsive to donor’s political interests as well as
recipient countries’ needs throughout the past six decades. The U.S. is likely to give food aid
to its political allies and countries with military-strategic importance to the United States,
especially when the U.S. cereal stocks are sufficient. With regard to recipient countries,
populous and poor countries as well as those countries suffering from disasters are likely to
receive more U.S. food aid. Importantly, the United States responds to production shortfalls in
recipient countries. This finding indicates a possibility of reverse causality between food aid
flows and domestic production, and thus justifies the use of the instrumental variable method
to isolate one effect from the other in the study of the impacts on production.
Our paper belongs in several branches of literature. First, our study adds new findings
on the patterns of food aid allocation. Previous studies cover shorter time periods than the
period in this study. Using a dataset with a long time period, our finding that U.S. food aid is
driven by both recipient needs and donor interests adds to existing evidence of the altruistic
and selfish objectives of food aid (Ball and Johnson, 1996; Eggleston, 1987). Similar to what
Young and Abbott (2008) found, patterns of food aid allocation change by regions over the
years. Not restricted to only cereal food aid as many papers were (Zahariadis, Travis, and
Ward, 2000), we also study the determinants of other types of food aid commodities,
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including dry milk powder and soybean oilseeds food aid. The conclusion that U.S.
production surpluses partially contribute to shipments of other food aid commodities besides
cereals provides additional evidence for the argument that food aid is driven by domestic
surpluses (Nunn and Qian, 2014a).
Second, our paper is closely related to a large body of literature that studies the impacts
of food aid on production. Different from these empirical studies, which commonly use the
VAR method (Lavy, 1990; Barrett, Mohapatra, and Snyder, 1999; Lowder, 2004), our paper
is the pioneer, as far as we know, to use the instrumental variable method to examine causal
effects of food aid on production.
Lastly, the instrument used in our paper follows the same logic as the identification
strategy used in the literature on impacts of foreign aid on economic outcomes. For example,
Werker, Ahmed, and Cohen (2008) studied the effects of transfers from wealthy OPEC nations
to their poorer Muslim allies. They interacted oil price with a binary indicator for Muslim
recipient countries and used this interaction term as the instrument for foreign aid. Similar to
Werker, Ahmed, and Cohen’s approach, other papers (Nunn and Qian, 2014b; Dreher and
Langlotz, 2015) also constructed instruments by interacting one variable that varies across
countries with another variable that changes over time. Our instrument follows the same logic
as previous studies in order to capture cross-sectional variations in the endogenous variable.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section II provides background of the U.S.
food aid programs. Section III discusses the literature review of the determinants of food aid
allocation as well as the impacts of food aid on production. Section IV illustrates the theoretical
framework used in the study of effects on food production. Section V describes the methods,
followed by the data descriptions. Section VII covers the results, and VIII summarizes findings
and concludes with policy implications.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
The United States has become a primary food aid donor since the enactment of
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (Public Law 480, or P.L. 480) on July 10,
1954 (Schnepf, 2015). Over the decades, the Unites States has become a leading figure in
fighting poverty and improving food security mainly through the provision of food
commodities with credit terms or food donations to developing countries. The U.S. food aid
system is complicated due to a large number of operating programs, the involvement of many
executive agencies, and multiple objectives that the U.S. aid programs seek to achieve. Given
the dominant position of the U.S. food aid and its complex nature, it is intriguing to have a
close look at the sixty years of history of the U.S. food aid programs by introducing the
operating programs, discussing objectives and efficiency, and analyzing patterns and evolution
of the U.S. food aid programs.
2.1 Operating Programs
Food for Peace Act (or P.L. 480)
The name of P.L. 480 was the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
1954 (P.L. 83-480). President John F. Kennedy named it the "Food for Peace Act" in 1961, but
the name of P.L. 480 was not officially changed to the Food for Peace Act (FFPA) until passage
of the 2008 farm bill. Table 1 lists all of the food aid programs, the starting date, the managing
agency, and information on annual appropriations for main programs since 1960. (Schnepf,
2015)
FFPA consists of four types of aid programs, which are Title I Economic Assistance
and Food Security, Title II Emergency and Private Assistance, Title III Food for Development,
and Title V Farmer-to-Farmer Program. Title I of the Food for Peace Act is administrated by
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the Foreign Agricultural Service of USDA, whereas Title II, Title III and Title V are operated
by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (Schnepf, 2015). The
Congress provides fundings for the programs through annual and supplemental appropriations.
FFPA Title I programs are the concessional credit sales of agricultural commodities
provided by the U.S. government to developing countries. The purpose of Title I aid is to
dispose of surplus cereals with the goals to reduce the U.S. government storage costs, expand
the U.S. export market, and support U.S. farmers. Title I aid is usually sold on credit or grant
terms rather than being freely distributed. That is to say, developing countries involved in Title
I programs can finance their purchase from the Commodity Credit Corporations (CCC), which
is managed by the USDA, through long-term and low-interest rate loans. The transactions of
Title I food aid were traditionally made between the U.S. government and recipient
governments. In 1996, Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO) and intergovernmental
organizations started to participate. After governments or private entities received Title I aid,
they typically sell, which is also known as monetize, food aid on the local markets to obtain
money for the alleviation of the government’s budget deficit, the investments in development
programs, or the payment of administrative costs. Title I aid has thus been conceptualized as
in-kind balance of payment assistance to recipient governments. In the 1960s and early 70s,
Title I food aid came from government-held food surplus stocks. However, the shrinkage in
the surplus stocks after the 1970s resulted in cereal purchases from private businesses in the
United States by the USDA’s FSA through invitations for bids.
Title I of the Food for Peace Act has been controversial since it was enacted, given its
explicitly stated purpose of enhancing the U.S. export market. Congressman Brooks Hays and
Congressman Page Belcher believed that food aid could promote trade by fostering a
preference for U.S. products in recipient countries, and thus enhance food aid recipient
countries’ dependency on U.S. imports over the long run (Ahlberg, 2009). To foster this
objective, one requirement enforced by the United States is to maintain the Usual Marketing
Requirements (UMRs) with the provision of food aid. With the concern that the recipient
country may displace imports with food aid instead of demanding more imports, UMRs
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require the recipient country to maintain exports on the same level as a country’s average
volume of trade over the past five years. The compliance of UMRs could theoretically impede
the displacement behaviors from recipient countries and ensure that food aid flows remain as
"additionality" (Deaton, 1980), although not many countries strictly complied with the UMRs
in reality. Nevertheless, Title I food aid has been considered as a "disguised export credit
program" (Barrett and Maxwell, 2007). Other exporters complained about this because it
violated the principle of free trade promoted by the WTO. In addition, the efficiency of Title I
aid has been criticized because the FAS has to purchase cereals in an open market at high
prices and ship aid via U.S.-flag carriers at a higher than the market rate. Thus, no new funds
have been appropriated to Title I since FY2006.
Title II of the Food for Peace Act is different from program aid because it is donated to
countries exposed to large-scale disasters in order to meet humanitarian needs. Title II aid
consists of two components: emergency assistance to address emergency food needs and
nonemergency assistance to address nonemergency economic development needs. The FFPA
requires the proportion of nonemergency assistance to be at least 75% of total Title II food aid,
but the USAID is authorized to alter this allocation ratio in accordance with actual needs of
each type. In fact, the volume of emergency assistance far outweighs the volume of
non-emergency aid, which only accounted for 25% of Title II commodities in 2010. (Schnepf,
2015) The United States mainly distributes Title II aid through Private Voluntary
Organizations (PVOs), cooperatives, and intergovernmental organizations. The donated
commodities come from the inventory held by the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), or
are purchased on the open market when the stock of inventory runs low. The CCC is
responsible for financing commodities, and for reimbursing transportation costs (ocean freight
and overland transportation costs) and the distribution costs that are involved when giving out
Title II aid. After the governments and other entities received Title II aid, they could sell these
commodities on the market subject to the restrictions in the agreement, and then use the
proceeds to finance development projects or help nations recover from disasters.
Title III, Food for Development, provides free commodities to developing country
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governments that then generally sell the food to fund long-term economic development
programs. Title III programs were no longer available after 1999.
Title V, the Farmer-to-Farmer program (FtF), was initially authorized in the 1985 farm
bill. The purpose of the Farmer-to-Farmer program is to enhance development in the
agricultural sectors in developing countries through the provision of technical assistance to
farmers and agricultural organizations.
Other Food Aid Programs
In addition to the four types of aid available under the Food for Peace Act, the U.S.
food aid system has five other food aid programs: Food for Progress (FFP), McGovern-Dole
International Food for Education and Child Nutrition program (IFECN), Section 416 (b), Bill
Emerson Humanitarian Trust (BEHT), and the Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP).
Except for Section 416 (b), which was permanently authorized by the Agricultural Act of 1949,
other aid programs have been reauthorized in periodic farm bills. (Schnepf, 2015) These four
aid programs were recently reauthorized through FY2018 in the 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79,
the Agricultural Act of 2014).
The Food for Progress (FFP) program commenced in 1985 under the Food for Progress
Act, and is administrated by the USDA. Food for Progress aims to improve agricultural
infrastructures, technologies and farmer education by donating commodities to developing
countries in return for the recipient countries’ promise to ease market entry and promote
competition in the agricultural sector. The McGovern-Dole International Food for Education
and Child Nutrition program (IFECN) was established by the 2002 farm bill. The USDA is the
managing agency of the IFECN, which donates commodities to governments, PVOs,
cooperatives, and intergovernmental organizations that proceed to sell the food to provide
funding for education-related projects. Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949 donates
commodities in excess of domestic requirements to other countries in order to avoid high
storage costs. In 2002, the Bush administration curtailed the use of 416(b) aid and employed
the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust instead. The Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust (BEHT)
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began in 1980, and is a reserve for food or cash managed by the USDA to provide additional
humanitarian needs to developing countries in the case of insufficient aid under FFPA Titles.
In 2008, the USDA sold the wheat held in the BEHT and invested funds in low-risk securities
to maximize its value. The BEHT has held only cash since FY2013. The Emergency Food
Security Program (EFSP) started in FY2010 to provide funds for local and regional
procurement of food commodities, cash transfers, and food vouchers to alleviate food
insecurity in response of emergencies. The EFSP, which is administrated by the USAID, aims
to achieve the same objectives as Title II in-kind food aid but uses different procurement
approaches that generally reduce the transportation time. The EFSP is funded by International
Disaster Assistance funds and is implemented through PVOs, cooperatives, and
intergovernmental organizations. (Schnepf, 2015)
2.2 Efficiency
The U.S. food aid program plays an important role in helping developing countries
recover from catastrophes and promote food security. The question of whether the program is
effective and efficient is under debate. Concerns regarding the efficacy of U.S. food aid
program involve the following three perspectives: multi-objectives of the food aid programs, a
large volume of in-kind food aid relative to cash-based food assistance, and the practice of
monetization.
Multi-objectives
According to the Tinbergen rule, the U.S. food aid program is ineffective because the
food aid program was designed to achieve multiple political objectives. The objectives of U.S.
food aid have been generally considered to be a political instrument for achieving "geopolitical,
agricultural trade promotion, surplus disposal and poverty alleviation objectives" (Barrett and
Maxwell, 2007). However, using one instrument to address these multifaceted goals violates
the Tinbergen rule, which stated that optimal policy requires one policy instrument for each
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objective. Ruttan (1990) pointed out that using food aid as an instrument to implement multiple
goals was an effort to circumvent the Tinbergen rule, which would eventually lead to a lack of
success.
In-kind Food Aid Versus Cash-based Food Assistance
Critics argue that in-kind food aid, meaning commodities purchased in donor countries
and shipped to recipient countries, is less effective than cash-based food assistance in terms
of timeliness of delivery and average cost. Research conducted by GAO (2007) showed that
cash-based food assistance can shorten the timeliness required to get food to people by up to 14
weeks compared to traditional in-kind food aid, which usually takes four to six months to ship
commodities from U.S. ports to designed destinations. A sample timeline of in-kind food aid
delivery from vendor in the U.S. to a village is shown in Table 2. The Kansas City Commodity
Office (KCCO) purchases food aid on a monthly basis to allow food orders to accumulate
before buying on the market in scale. It then takes roughly three months for the KCCO to
collect food and transportation bids and award contracts. Commodity vendors bag the food and
deliver it to the U.S. ports for shipment in the next 1 to 2 months. Depending on the distance
to the port and the destination, ocean transportation time can vary from two to three months to
arrive at an overseas port. There, the food is dispatched to the primary warehouse, from which
the food aid is then delivered to villages or targeted households with assistance from the PVOs.
This six-month delivery window of in-kind food aid may cause food spoilage or even the loss
of lives due to the inability to respond to disasters in a timely manner. In addition, a GAO’s
study (2007) determined that the peak time for food aid purchases in the U.S. occurs during
August and September. This results in the U.S. in-kind food aid failing to arrive in recipient
countries during their peak hunger season, which occurs from October to January in Africa, for
example. However, cash-based food assistance usually requires one to two months to arrive at
destinations, with a considerable reduction in the amount of time required for food procurement
and ocean transportation.
Compared with cash-based food assistance, in-kind food aid is more costly due to high
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transportation costs (mainly shipping costs) as a result of fulfillment of the Cargo Preference
Act, which requires that at least half of U.S. commodity aid must be shipped on U.S. flag
vessels. The freight rates on U.S. flag vessels are higher than on counterpart vessels, such as
foreign commercial ships. The cargo preference regulation increases the cost of in-kind aid
shipments. The shipping expenditures also come from the congressional appropriations, so the
available amount of funds for commodities drops as a result of high shipping costs. According
to a GAO study (2007), approximately 65 percent of overall expenditures are spent on ocean
transportation and other noncommodity costs, such as administration and in-country delivery
costs. However, Local and Regional Procurement (LRP) reduced the costs of in-kind food aid
delivered to Sub-Saharan African and Asian countries by approximately 30% during the 2001-
2008 period, according to a GAO study (2009). This reduction in the average cost of food aid
allows aid to reach more people in need.
Given the advantages of cash-based food assistance, one concern regarding the current
U.S. food aid program arises from the large proportion of in-kind food aid in the overall
program, which involves $1.9 billion (92%) of annual outlays during the FY2006-FY2013
period (Schnepf, 2015). Only the Title V Farmer-to-Farmer and cash-based EFSP programs
are cash-based food assistance, whereas the remaining programs involve in-kind food aid.
Major donors around the world have shifted from in-kind food aid to cash-based assistance
since 2000s. Although the United States started EFSP in 2010, the dominant position of
in-kind food aid leads to calls for reform of U.S. food aid, which calls for more flexibility in
food procurement in local and regional markets.
Monetization
In-kind food aid is typically monetized by local government or PVOs, and the behavior
of selling in-kind food aid in local markets (monetization) is an inefficient use of resources and
may distort local markets. One U.S. dollar spent by the U.S. government will lead to less than
one dollar of proceeds the local governments or PVOs could receive through monetization due
to ocean transportation costs and administrative expenses. In a 2011 study, GAO found that
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proceeds generated through monetization are 76% of original costs if the food aid program is
administrated by USAID. It is 58% if the administrative agency is the USDA. Thus, a great
deal of resources are wasted in the process of monetization. The other issue associated with
monetization is the likelihood of market distortion caused by large-volume sales. Without
targeting the aid to the population in need, large-volume sales involved in the monetization
are likely to depress local markets via lower commodity prices. To prevent or minimize the
disincentive effects of food aid on local markets, USAID imposed the Bellmon requirements
in 1977. The Bellmon requirements require that U.S. food aid should not be distributed to
countries that have inadequate storage facilities or countries that are likely to be negatively
affected by food aid. However, the GAO reported that a Bellmon analysis contains a weak
market assessment and little or no post-monetization evaluations, and thus does not impede the
disincentive effect, if any exists. The Food Aid Reform proposal in the FY 2014 President’s
Budget suggested an elimination of Title II monetization in order to save about $30 million per
year, although this proposal was opposed by PVOs whose costs are largely covered by proceeds
from monetization (Schnepf, 2015). Regardless of the obstacles, it is certain that the U.S. food
aid reform has begun, with a focus on increasing the flexibility of food assistance delivery and
reducing average costs in order to reach more people in need.
2.3 Patterns and Trends
Cereals account for 90.26% of all food aid commodities. They are undoubtedly the
primary U.S. food aid commodity. Aggregating the quantity of U.S. food aid delivered to all
countries in a given year, Figure 1 shows the total volume of U.S. cereal aid and U.S. non-
cereal aid between 1961 and 2006. The quantity of cereal aid far outweighs the quantity of
non-cereal aid. Given this figure, it makes sense to focus on cereal aid when analyzing U.S.
food aid. In addition to grains, the U.S. also delivers six other categories of commodities.
These include animal products, fruits, oilseeds, cotton, vegetables, and tobacco. The relative
proportion of each commodity group is shown in Figure 2-1. The volume of oilseed aid comes
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in as the second largest, with a percentage of 5.5 of total U.S. food aid. The animals and animal
products aid group constitutes 3.1% of total food aid and is the third largest aid commodity
category. Tobacco is the least frequently delivered commodity over the period of 1961 to 2006.
Among U.S. cereal aid, wheat is the primary donated crop, constituting 71.6% of donations,
as shown in Figure 2-2. The second largest cereal group is feed grains, including barley, corn,
grain sorghum, cornmeal, rolled oats, and other products. This group accounts for 19.08%
of U.S. cereal aid. Rice and blended products are the third and fourth major cereals with
proportions of 7% and 3%, respectively.
The variations in the commodity composition of U.S. food aid shipments are moderate
from 1961 to 2006. Figure 3 shows the relative proportion of each commodity group during
each decade. One obvious trend is that the ratio of grain aid to total aid decreased over time,
dropping from 93% in the 1960s to 83% in the 2000s, while oilseed food aid began to grow in
importance and became the second largest commodity group. This trend corresponds to the
shrinking grain stocks in the United States. Nevertheless, grains remained the main
commodities that the U.S. shipped to recipient countries regardless of a slight drop in the
relative proportion. As regards the types of cereal aid delivered, wheat is the primary type of
grain. Wheat’s relative proportion fluctuated between 80% in the 1960s and 58% in the 1990s,
and reached 67% in the 2000s, as shown in Figure 4. This fluctuation might be a result of
changes in annual aid budget or the prices of grain commodities. In addition, a gradual
increase in the proportion of blended products is worth mentioning, shown in Figure 5.
Blended products are also known as fortified blended foods (FBFs), which are supplementary
to typical grains and legumes. FBFs contain more nutrition than unfortified grains and
legumes since FBFs are fortified with essential micronutrients. The pattern of shipping an
increasing proportion of food aid in the form of FBFs over time reflects an emphasis on
sending nutritious food and improving food aid quality, though the absolute amount of FBFs
in the food aid program is much lower than that of wheat.
Over the course of sixty years, the volume of different types of aid programs varies in
accordance with the variations in the objectives of the U.S. aid program. Title I food aid was
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predominant before the 1970s. After the mid-1970s, the amount of program aid was reduced
due to a reduction in stocks, and was replaced by emergency aid, which emerged as the most
prominent form of aid in the 1990s. The status of emergency aid was reinforced when the 1990
farm bill explicitly stated the promotion of food insecurity as one primary objective of food
aid. However, because of the limitations of our data set, we are unable to plot the variations
in the different aid programs over time. Aggregating the amount of in-kind food aid, Figure
1 demonstrates the trends over time for total U.S. cereal aid.1The U.S. cereal aid shipments
dropped dramatically in the early 1970s because of a reduction in food stocks caused by the
world food crisis. Then, U.S. cereal aid grew steadily and peaked in the early 1990s. Together
with the drain in the cereal surpluses, food aid shipments fell to historical lows during the
mid-1990s.
In addition, U.S. food aid shipments vary a great deal by region and are closely aligned
with U.S. political interests in particular regions. Figure 5 demonstrates the changes in the
amount of aid delivered to six regions over time. In the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s,
the United States allocated considerable tons of food aid to South Asia, where many countries
were swinging back and forth between capitalism and communism. In 1973, the world food
crisis erupted. African countries were hit badly and also became recipients of U.S. food aid. In
the mid-1970s, the U.S. shipped aid to Middle Eastern countries in response to the oil embargo,
which began in 1973. The U.S. continued sending aid in the 1980s to Middle Eastern countries
to claim its interest in these countries’ natural resources. After the end of the Cold War, the U.S.
escalated food aid shipments to Europe for the purpose of alleviating the tense relationships
with the former Eastern Bloc countries. Since the late 1990s, most food aid has gone to Sub-
Saharan African countries, which suffer severely from a variety of natural disasters and chronic
poverty. This trend corresponds with the fact that emergency aid has outweighed other types of
food aid since the 1990s up to the present day.
The variations in the amount of U.S. food aid assistance are apparent by regions over
time, as are the variations in the top destinations within each region. Figure 6 contains two
1Despite the best effort, we still could not get food aid data in 1990 and 1991.
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treemaps, which show the accumulated amount of aid received by countries in each region
using nested rectangles prior to 1990 and after 1990. The size of the rectangle is proportional to
the quantity of aid, and the color ramp represents the absolute value of U.S. cereal aid received
by countries, ranging from 0 on the left of the ramp to the highest value on the right of the ramp,
corresponding to white and navy blue, respectively. The graphs show that the top destinations
for aid have changed significantly. Before 1990, India and Pakistan in South Asia, Egypt in
Middle East and North Africa, Brazil in Latin America and Caribbean, Sudan in Sub-Saharan
Africa, and South Korea in East Asia and the Pacific received the greatest amounts of aid in
each of their respective regions. South Asia was the most popular region for aid shipments,
and European and Central Asian and Sub-Saharan African countries received relatively less
food aid. However, the proportion of aid delivered to South Asia plummeted after 1990, and
a significant proportion of aid went to Europe and Central Asia, particularly to Russia and
the former Soviet Union. In addition, a rise in the distribution of aid to Sub-Saharan African
countries indicates a shift in the objectives of aid programs toward a focus on the alleviation
of food insecurity. Compared with recipient countries before 1990, the destinations were more
widespread within regions after 1990. The top destinations to receive food aid during the 1990-
2006 period were Ethiopia and Eritrea in Sub-Saharan Africa, Russia in Europe and Central
Asia, Peru and Bolivia in Latin America and the Caribbean, Bangladesh in South Asia, Yemen
in Middle East and North Africa, and Pakistan and Indonesia in East Asia and the Pacific.
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CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW
A vast body of literature has emerged on U.S. food aid-related topics since the food aid
programs began in 1954. The economic literature on food aid covers two main topics:
determinants of food aid allocation and the socio-economic impacts of food aid. The results
show a mix of positive and negative evidence of the impacts of food aid on developing
countries due to various analytical methods and data used. Nevertheless, these theoretical and
empirical studies provide researchers and policy makers insights into the overall efficiency
and effectiveness of the U.S. food aid programs. In this section, we will discuss the literature
on the factors that affect aid allocation as well as the impacts of food aid on recipient-country
production.
3.1 Determinants
As for the determinants of U.S. food aid, theoretical and empirical researchers agree
that determinants are either from donor countries’ own objectives or from recipient countries’
needs, or both. In summary, the factors can be a combination of humanitarian interests,
economic interests, political objectives, and export market promotion goals. Papers in this
branch of literature examine various factors that could exert an influence on aid volume and
aid distribution, such as stocks of food commodities in donor countries (Nunn and Qian,
2014a; Diven, 2001), colonial past (Alesina and Dollar, 2000), voting patterns in the U.N.
(Alesina and Dollar, 2000), antagonism of communism (Boschini and Olofsgard, 2007), donor
countries’ interest in Middle East (Alesina and Dollar, 2000), U.S. military presence
(Meernik, Krueger, and Poe, 1998), trade and economic development (Poe and Meernik,
1995), production shocks in recipient countries (Nunn and Qian, 2014a), catastrophes in
recipient countries (Canavire Bacarreza et al., 2005), and the level of democratization in
recipient countries (Alesina and Dollar, 2000).
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The driving factors underlying U.S. food aid shipments have not been static or
monotonous over the past sixty years. Eggleston (1987) concluded that U.S. food aid
allocation considered both recipient needs and U.S. political and military interests from
1955-1979. Shapouri and Missiaen (1990) studied the patterns of U.S. food aid allocation over
the period of 1975 and 1985. They found that the factors that affected aid giving in
Eggleston’s study were still significant from 1975 to 1985. In addition, the donor interests in
the form of export promotion became a significant determinant of U.S. food aid allocation.
Ball and Johnson (1996) also studied several competing objectives of U.S. food aid policy and
whether the motivations changed during the period of 1971-1990. They concluded that U.S.
food aid shipments in the 1970s were served to fulfill its own economic and strategic interests,
but humanitarian concerns started to be factors driving U.S. food aid shipments in the 1980s.
In addition, Ball and Johnson (1996) found that objectives for different types of food aid were
also different. Political factors, such as U.S. exports of arms and voting similarity at the UN,
were more important in determining Title I food aid than humanitarian considerations. In
contrast, humanitarian factors were significant, but political variables were insignificant in the
allocation of Title II food aid. The allocation patterns across titles were consistent with the
stated objectives.
Other literature studied several donor countries to compare different objectives that
have driven aid allocation. Alesina and Dollar (2000) found that determinants of giving aid
diverge a lot between donors. Specifically, the Nordic donors were likely to reward countries
with democratic institutions and free trade policies. The United States’s pattern of aid giving
is closely related to its interest in the Middle Eastern countries. Berthélemy and Tichit (2004)
used a rich dataset with coverage of 22 donors and 137 recipients from 1980-1999. They
constructed a three-dimensional panel analysis to allow for comparisons among donors over
time. They concluded that formal colonial links had a positive influence on aid allocation
policies for all donors. Many donors, for instance the U.S. and Australia, rewarded good
economic performances after the Cold War. The focus of this paper is on the U.S. food aid
programs, so the literature on aid distribution behaviors from multiple donors will not be
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vastly expanded.
Although many papers have studied the factors that cause cross-country differences in
terms of volumes of U.S. food aid received, very few papers take the censored nature of the
variable food aid into consideration. As Dudley and Montmarquette first stated in 1976, the
process of general aid allocation involves two steps: choosing the eligible countries and
determining how much aid to allocate among recipients. Zahariadis, Travis, and Ward (2000)
applied the two-stage process to food aid and studied U.S. food aid allocations to African
countries from 1978 to 1990. The value zero of the dependent variable represents a choice
made by the donor, and thus running the linear estimation using the sub-sample (countries that
received positive aid) could yield biased estimates. In order to minimize selection bias, we
will use Chamberlain’s random effects tobit model. In addition, this paper contributes to the
existing literature by estimating determinants of U.S. food aid on a rich dataset covering the
period of 1961-2006. This allows us to see which factors play a role in shaping U.S. food aid
allocation, and how the importance of each factor changes over time across regions. These
results are useful to provide an insight about the U.S. food aid programs, and build a
foundation upon the second part of analysis on the consequences of food aid on food
production.
3.2 Effects of Food Aid on Production
The study on food aid has been discussed since 1960, only a few years after the
enactment of food aid laws, but researchers have not reached an agreement on the impact of
food aid on agricultural production. The results vary a lot depending on methodology, data
quality, time span, and the set of countries. In general, qualitative studies are more likely to
conclude that food aid may have a disincentive effect on domestic production through the
following channels, such as reduced domestic food prices, a change in government’s policy in
agriculture, and a distortion in labor supply. Empirical studies, however, rarely have sufficient
evidence to conclude a negative relationship between food aid and food production. The
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quantitative studies focus on either the household- or nation-level, and methodologies are
different depending on whether the study is static or dynamic. It is more prevalent to observe a
slightly positive effect of food aid on production at the household level while the neutral
relationship is commonly found in the across-country analysis.
Schultz (1960) was the pioneer to evaluate the implications of food aid policy on
underdeveloped economies. Specifically, he speculated an adverse effect of P.L. 480 aid on
agriculture in the receiving countries because food aid acts as "additionality" to local food
supplies, which could lead to a drop in local food prices and a corresponding depression in the
food market. The validity of analysis is based upon one crucial assumption: the country
strictly complies the Usual Marketing Requirements (UMRs), which is to maintain the same
level of imports from the United States regardless of the volumes of food aid received.
However, the literature shows that the UMRs are not strictly enforced (Maxwell and Singer,
1979; Fitzpatrick and Storey, 1989; Barrett, Mohapatra, and Snyder, 1999; Von Braun and
Huddleston, 1988). Specifically, Barrett and Heisey (2002) estimated that up to 60-80 percent
of the imports would be replaced by food aid in recipient countries. In addition, the focus of
Schultz’s study was mainly on P.L. 480 Title I food aid, which took up a considerable
proportion of the food aid program in the 1960s and 1970s. The dramatic changes in the
proportion of various types of aid programs in the following years make it appealing to
examine the impacts of other titles of food aid on agricultural production.
In 1963, Fisher refined Schultz’s study by providing a rigorous framework with a
remarkable conclusion. He suggested that food aid might have a non-negligible income effect
on receiving countries when the governments monetize the commodities and use funds to
support domestic agriculture or economic development. Although food aid inflows might
reduce domestic prices as proposed by Schultz in 1960, this disincentive effect might be
mitigated as the long-run positive income effect plays a role to offset the negative impact of
food aid on the agricultural market. Acknowledging the existence of both disincentive and
income effects of food aid, Fisher’s study fairly explains the root of the unsettled debate on the
impacts of food aid. However, Doriye, White, and Wuyts (1997) found in a empirical study in
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Tanzania that the recipient country’s government did not use the monetized funds from food
aid to increase government expenditure but to offset the trade deficit. This finding poses a
concern regarding the existence of the long-term positive income effect of food aid.
Barrett and Maxwell (2006) looked at the impacts of food aid on food prices from the
households’ perspective and determined the possible existence of disincentives of food aid to
domestic production. They interpreted the pressure on local food prices as a result of
unbalanced demand-supply relationships, and the pressure was especially high when the trade
in that country was close to the outside markets. In their argument, the provision of food or
cash could be considered as a transfer of income. For households, food aid was equivalent to
an income effect on the demand for food, which might give them more purchasing power to
buy a higher quantity of food that they would not be able to afford without the extra income
caused by food aid flows. Thus, the provision of in-kind food aid increases the demand and
supply of food. Based on the logic of Engel’s law, which states that the income elasticity of
demand for food is less than one, the increase in the income is greater than the increase in the
demand for food. This indicates that supply grows faster than demand, and thus creates the
demand-supply imbalance. As a result, the consequence associated with the demand-supply
imbalance is a reduction in prices. The extent of the reduction in price depends on the
elasticity of demand for food as well as the elasticity of supply for food in the empirical
studies.
In addition to the price mechanism that may discourage production, Maxwell and
Singer (1979) argued that a depression in agriculture associated with food aid might come
from a change in governments’ willingness to make policy reforms and communities’
behavior in implementing development projects. For example, Salisbury (1992) reported that
Ethiopians intended to plant trees upside down in a FFW project to encourage the ongoing
food aid assistance. Groupe (2005) reported that some communities in Afghanistan stopped
maintenance on public goods due to an anticipation of food aid flows on the same projects.
These behaviors are called community-level moral hazard, imposing an adverse effect on
market by taking more risk (Barrett and Maxwell, 2006). In addition, the availability of food
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aid may give excuses to local governments to postpone policy reforms in agriculture. This
situation is also called the Samaritan’s Dilemma. This states that an anticipation of ex-post
relief may crowd out the government’s willingness to implement policy reforms, which would
have been done if there were no aid assistance. In Raschky and Schwindt’s study (2009), they
examined whether an anticipation of ex-post assistance crowded out government’s protective
actions in a response of storms, floods and earthquakes between 1980 and 2002. They found
that the crowd-out effect outweighed the protective effect for storms. If the local government
heavily relied on food aid, postponements of policy reforms or reductions in agricultural
investment would lead to stagnation in economic growth.
Another possible path through which food aid may adversely affect agricultural
production is household labor. Specifically, two types of distortions are possible: one is the
labor income effect; the other is the labor substitution effect, which only applies to the
food-for-work (FFW) program. Since the provision of aid or cash is equivalent to an income
transfer, the labor income effect states that workers with higher income would prefer to reduce
their working hours, as the fundamental microeconomic theory predicts. Thus, food aid may
discourage local producers to farm, which may result in a reduction in food production.
Furthermore, the empirical evidence shows that labor supply became more responsive to
income changes when households are wealthier. This indicates that the labor disincentive
effect is greater when the aid flows go to wealthier families who are more likely to transfer
extra income to leisure instead of production. The labor disincentive effect is mitigated when
the food aid is targeted towards the most need recipients. The other type of labor distortion
occurs when the high payoff of the food-for-work (FFW) programs encourages workers to
switch from local agricultural businesses to food aid-based programs. This substitution
behavior leads to a reduction in labor inputs in local food production, theoretically causing an
adverse impact on agriculture production. However, things can get complicated in reality. As
Holden, Barrett, and Hagos (2006) stated, FFW programs could generate immediate or
short-term benefits to local food production, even though this positive effect might be offset
by medium to long-term labor disincentive effects.
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The previous literature provided speculation on three mechanisms of how food aid
affects food production. Admittedly, government policy and labor input are important
channels through which the impacts of food aid on production occur. The main debate has
focused on the price effect of food aid. The theoretical studies provided ambiguous
conclusions as to whether food aid reduced food price, and thereby decreasing domestic
production. The lack of consensus makes it necessary to resort to empirical tests.
The empirical evidence of the disincentive effects of food aid on food production is
relatively thin. Tschirley, Donovan, and Weber (1996) studied the effects of yellow maize food
aid on maize production in Mozambique. They used monthly arrivals of food aid data and
monthly retail market prices of yellow and white maize in the capital Maputo from March
1990 to January 1995. They found the evidence of a fall in market price of maize which was
caused by an inflow of commercial and emergence yellow maize. This price effect penetrated
to white maize, which is a substitute of yellow maize, and other contingent markets outside
Maputo. This finally caused a depression in incentives of maize producers. Being consistent
with Schultz’s concerns, Gelan (2007) also supported the existence of disincentive effects of
food aid but from a different perspective. He used a computable general equilibrium model
to prove a modest increase in food prices and a growth in food production as much as 2.2%
with a removal of food aid in Ethiopia. In addition, Tadesse and Shively (2009) concluded a
negative impact of food aid on food prices using a system of seemingly unrelated regression
model with monthly data from three local markets over the period 1996-2006 in Ethiopia.
This negative impact of aid shipments on food prices only applied to internationally traded
goods. Importantly, they argued that the corresponding adverse influence on production caused
by a reduction in prices was observable when the food aid accounts for more than 10% of
local production. Food aid shipments with quantities below this threshold tended to be benign.
Although this cut-off has little generalization power, Tadesse and Shively’s study provided an
insight of complexity in which the effect of food aid could be subject to the characteristics
of local markets. Some of these characteristics are easily to control for, such as the relative
proportion of food aid over total production, while others are much harder to be captured in the
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model. If we failed to controlled for these characteristics, the results would be problematic and
misleading.
After Tadesse and Shively’s publication, several researchers also addressed the
importance of controlling for confounding effects and emphasized how misleading the
statements would be if the model were not well specified. Dayton and Hoddinott (2004)
examined if there were disincentive effects of food aid on household behaviors in rural
Ethiopia in the 1990s. Simple test statistics supported the existence of disincentive effects on
households. Food aid reduced labor supply, crowded-out private transfers, and created
dependency in the long run. However, when the authors took households’ characteristics into
consideration, adverse effects disappeared. On the contrary, the results showed that food aid
led to an increase in labor supply to agriculture. Similarly, Abdulai, Barrett, and Hoddinott
(2005) found that the effects of food aid on production in Africa turned from negative under
the OLS regression to positive once the confounding factors were considered.
Bearing the importance of correct specification in mind, it is also important to be aware
of government’s role in determining the effects of food aid. Mann (1967) found that food aid
significantly reduced food production in India. Several years later, Isenman and Singer (1977)
also studied the impacts of food aid on production in India, and the disincentive effects reduced
dramatically due to the successful implementation of food distribution policy. In addition, Hall
(1980) showed that P.L. 480 wheat imports had a positive impact on grain production because
government used excess revenue gained from the food aid to support domestic grain producers.
Recently, Bezuneh, Deaton, and Zuhair (2003) used a system of equations to estimate the short-
term effects of food aid on the economy of Tunisia for the period of 1960-1992. They found
that the active role of the government in domestic pricing was a key contributor to domestic
production and economic growth. The disincentive effects of food aid were minimized through
appropriate public policies.
Other scholars are not convinced by the significant impact of food aid on production.
Little (2008) argued that few farmers could alter their production behavior because food aid
delivery was too uncertain and poorly timed. Thus, he did not find significant impacts of
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food aid on production in Northeastern Ethiopia from 1999-2000 and 2002-2003. Mabuza
et al. (2009) looked at the maize market in Swaziland from 1985-2006, and could not find the
empirical evidence that food aid lowered prices of maize or affected maize production in the
subsequent years using the reduced form market equilibrium model.
The preceding studies have different answers as to whether food aid has a disincentive,
positive or neutral effect on food production. To have a broad idea of how the world has been
affected, we should discuss the impact of food aid from the cross-country analysis. Compared
to the market-level analysis for specific countries, the multi-country analysis is relatively
meager due to the obstacles in terms of data acquisition and econometric methods. Data for
developing countries over a long time period is hard to obtain, and the reliability of data is
under suspicion. The likely misspecification of econometrics model another concern, which
can lead to biased results. Nevertheless, the multi-country empirical studies provide valuable
results that are applicable to many potential recipient countries. This makes it meaningful to
look at the effects of food aid on production from a global perspective.
Similar to the results of the market-level or household-level studies, no conclusive
statement regarding the effect of food aid has been made using national level data. Barrett,
Mohapatra, and Snyder (1999) pioneered to study the dynamic effects of US food aid on
eighteen countries over period 1961-1995. The paper applied structural vector autoregression
method to examine the dynamic relationships between food aid, production, and trade. They
found a J-curve effect of food aid on trade volumes in recipient countries, meaning that
commercial transactions initially decreased before increasing in the long run. However, the
effects of aid on production were very modest. Although food aid seems to have neither
stimulative nor disincentive effects on production in the long run, Barrett, Mohapatra, and
Snyder (1999) stated that food aid had an initially negative impact on production through the
adverse influence on prices, but soon recovered. This was possible because the recipient
countries reduced the balance-of-payments due to the food aid inflows, and thus could
increase the imports of durable inputs (e.g. machinery or fertilizer). However, the data in this
paper only involved program food aid, which was only a small proportion over the total food
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aid in the 1990s. In 2004, Lowder made an improvement upon Barrett’s study by using both
program and targeted (humanitarian) food aid from the International Food Aid Information
(INTERFAIS) data from 1988 to 2000 covering 64 countries. Using a dynamic structural
equation model, Lowder (2004) found that neither targeted nor program food aid affected food
production. When restricting the sample to Sub-Saharan African countries, Abdulai, Barrett,
and Hoddinott (2005) studied 42 African countries from 1970-2000. They found that any
disincentive effects caused by depressed product prices were offset by positive influences on
balance of payments and exchange rates. Lavy (1990) also found a significant positive effect
of food aid on local production in Sub-Saharan Africa using the VAR approach, but did not
explain much why the positive effect would happen.
A common drawback in the multi-country studies is that they fail to address endogeneity
problem of food aid. In the papers that used VAR, they used the lagged food aid variables as
instruments for endogenous variable food aid, but this could not fully solve the simultaneity
problem. The results under the VAR method mainly reveal correlations. To learn more about
the direction and magnitude of the relationships between aid and production, we will use the
instrumental variable method in this paper to study whether whether US food aid has any impact
on local production. Another contribution of this paper is to use the USDA food aid data from
1961-2006. Most cross-country papers use the INTERFAIS data and do not cover such a long
time period. In addition, this paper reconciles the commodities in FAO production data with
USDA food aid data to make sure that exactly the same commodities are included at each
aggregation level. This allows us to provide more precise estimations.
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CHAPTER 4
FRAMEWORK
The conceptual framework in studying the effects of food aid on production is built
upon the partial equilibrium models, and we follow Lowder’s approach (2004). An important
factor to explore the possible impacts on production is the degree of displacement of imports
caused by food aid. In general, a full displacement would leave domestic supply unchanged,
whereas a partial displacement would increase supply by a magnitude proportional to the extent
of displacement. One important factor that could determine how much food aid displaces
imports is the type of food aid. Three main aid programs are of interest and are divided into
two categories based on intrinsic characteristics: one is the non-targeted food aid, comprising
program food aid; the other group is the targeted food aid, comprising project and emergency
food aid. The difference between non-targeted and targeted food aid is whether food aid is
targeted to intended beneficiaries. One thing to note is that the non-targeted program food aid
is subject to the UMRs, which were introduced by the Consultative Sub-Committee on Surplus
Disposal (CSSD) and aimed to prevent imports displacement. Targeted food aid is not subject
to the UMRs.
Figure 7- 11 show the effects of food aid on production using a supply-demand model
for non-targeted and targeted food aid programs, correspondingly. In general, the effects of
program food aid on production are negative or neutral, while the effects of targeted food
aid are neutral or even positive under certain circumstances. The following paragraphs will
discuss different scenarios for each type of the food aid programs given various degrees of
UMR enforcement and the extent of import displacement.
A few assumptions are necessary to make sure the theoretical model is sound. First, we
assume that the U.S. food aid commodities are perfect substitutes for the local commodities.
In addition, we assume a three-country world, with one importer, one donor and one exporter.
The recipient country is the importer, who imports food from the exporter and receives food
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aid from the donor. As for the donor, the United States in our case, also exports commodities
to developing countries. So we assume that the donor and exporter is the same country. The
exporter has comparative advantage in food production, and can produce food at a price below
the world price PE . The quantity of food aid delivered by the donor is equal to QFA, and the
quantity of commercial exports is equal to QI .
For program food aid, three situations are possible.
1. A successful enforcement of UMRs leads to a full additionality of food aid on domestic
supply. St inceases by QFA. An excessive supply of food decreases the price of food,
which discourages food production.
2. An unsuccessful enforcement of UMRs leads to a partial displacement of imports. St
inceases by QFA−QDisplacedimports. A market surplus results in a reduction in the food
price. A lower price of food discourages production, but to a lesser extent compared with
the first situation.
3. An unsuccessful enforcement of UMRs leads to a full displacement of imports. St
remains stable. Food aid will not affect production.
To put it in detail, a successful enforcement of UMRs means that the government in the recipient
country has to purchase the pre-determined quantity of imports (QI) at the pre-agreed price
(PE), shown in Figure 7. An inflow of food aid increases domestic supply St by QFA, leading
to a reduction in the domestic price. A lower price of the food commodity may discourage
farmers from producing food. Some farmers could be driven out of business when the revenue
made at PN is not enough to cover costs. Others who stay in the market may reduce the amount
of resources, such as labor inputs. Either situation would lead to a drop in food production. It is
also possible, in the long run, that the government may hesitate to fund agricultural investment
or to push policy reforms arising from a low level of production. This unsupportive behavior to
agriculture from the government would aggravate the negative effects of aid on production. As
a result, the country would become highly dependent on food aid if the decrease in domestic
production were large or lasted a long time.
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In reality, a successful enforcement of UMRs rarely happens. The recipient government
generally does not strictly comply with the import quantity and price determined in the UMRs.
Depending on the price at which the recipient country’s government resells the program food
aid, a partial displacement of imports or even a full displacement would happen. Figure 8
depicts a situation where food aid partially displaces imports. Since the displacement of imports
with food aid occurs, the recipient country imports less food compared to the quantity of food
imported under the enforcement of UMRs, which means QI ′ < QI . This leads to an increase in
food supply St by an amount less than the extent at which food aid is fully additional. Without
the government’s intervention on the price, food aid drives down the price to PN ′. Compared
to Figure 7, the reduction in the price is smaller due to the import displacement. Again, this
causes a disincentive effect for producers but to a lesser extent. If the government decides to
protect domestic food producers and resells food aid at the world price PE , the imports will
be fully displaced by food aid (QI −QI ′′ = QFA), as shown in Figure 9. Domestic supply St
remains stable since food aid is offset by the reduction in imports. The total consumption of
food comprises of food aid QFA and the new quantity of imports QI ′′. In this case, production
will not be affected by food aid.
For targeted food aid, we will discuss different scenarios for project and emergency
food aid programs. Project food aid is non-emergency in nature, which provides consistent
assistance for nutrition enhancement programs. Given that project food aid is free of charge,
project food aid can be considered as a transfer of income. That is to say, project food aid is
equivalent to an increase in the households’ income, which is captured by an outward shift in
the demand curve, as shown in Figure 10. For households, regardless of how poor they are,
the income elasticity of demand for food is greater than zero and less than one.1It means that
households consume less than one dollar of food for every one-dollar increase in the income.
This shifts the demand curve by a magnitude of εiQFA to the right, where the εi is the income
elasticity of demand for food in country i. Since only a proportion of total food aid is demanded
by people, (1− εi)QFA remains as the unconsumed amount, which is the total leakage of food
aid that flows to the market. (1− εi) measures the extent of leakage. If the amount of food
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aid that flows to the market (1− εi)QFA fully displaces imports, the total amount of imports
reduces by (1− εi)QFA. Domestic supply remains stable, and production is not discouraged
unless the amount of leaked food aid (1− εi)QFA is greater than QI . If the amount of food
aid that flows to the market partially displaces imports, domestic supply increases by a small
amount, which is the difference between (1−εi)QFA and the amount of imports displaced. This
increase in St may lead to moderate disincentive effects or most likely neutral effects due to the
small magnitude in the increase of food supply.
As for the emergency food aid, the situation is slightly different from that under the
project food aid. Similar to project food aid, emergency food aid is considered as a transfer of
income since the recipient government received the aid for free, shifting the demand curve to
the right, as shown in Figure 11. However, the delivery of emergency food aid is usually
responsive to natural disasters, which presumably have caused a huge negative impact on
domestic production before the arrival of aid. This fact leads to a shift in the supply curve to
the left for emergency food aid, being different from the change in the supply curve for project
food aid. Since the amount of food aid delivered is generally less than the reduction in
production caused by disasters, the supply curve for the recipient is Si′′, resulting in QEI ′ as an
extra amount of imports compared to the original import level QI . Again, (1− εi)QFA is the
amount of aid that flows to the market. If the unconsumed quantity of food aid (1− εi)QFA is
equal to QEI ′, the recipient imports food at the original amount QI . Domestic supply St
remains the same, and thus there is no disincentive effect for farmers. However, it is more
likely that (1− εi)QFA is less than QEI ′, which requires the government to increase imports by
QEI ′− (1− εi)QFA in order to maintain the same consumption level as before the disaster. If
the recipient’s government fails to fulfill the demand, food supply in the current year would be
in shortage. As a result, local farmers may be motivated to increase production in the
following year.
1The income elasticity of demand for food is highest among low-income countries, according to the World
Bank Report (2012). For example, the income elasticity of demand for food was 0.85 in the Democratic Republic
of Congo and was 0.71 in Armenia in 2012.
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CHAPTER 5
METHOD
In this section, we talk about the econometric methods used when studying the patterns
of U.S. food aid allocation and the impacts of food aid on production, respectively. To take
the corner solution outcome into account, we decide to use a tobit model to examine U.S. food
aid allocation. We then provide statistical evidence on unbiasedness and consistency of the
tobit estimator. With regard to the effects of food aid on production, the instrumental variable
method is adopted to account for simultaneity bias. We thoroughly discuss the internal validity
of the instrument, followed by a statistical illustration of the IV approach.
5.1 Determinants
Since the U.S. ships food aid only to targeted countries, the sample contains many zero
food aid flow observations. With many dependent variables equal to zero, the dependent
variable in our case is a corner solution. Ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression can not
generate consistent parameter estimates, as the observed sample is of limited usefulness for
inference about the entire population. Two methods are used to estimate this model from the
previous literature.
The first method is the two-part model, which is used to replicate the two-stage decision
making process (Dudley and Montmarquette, 1976). In the first stage or gate-keeping stage,
the U.S. has to decide to whom to allocate food aid, which is equivalent to a Probit model that
determines the probability of receiving aid. During the second stage, the U.S. has to decide
how much food aid goes to each eligible country, which can be estimated by a linear model
using the sub-sample of positive aid observations.
The second method is the tobit model, which estimates the patterns of aid allocation in
one step. The aid allocation is an outcome of the maximum of zero and a linear function of
independent variables. The estimation is conducted in one step, so that we assume that the
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factors that determine the probability of obtaining food aid are the same as the factors that
determine the amount of food aid in the allocation.
In this paper, we use the tobit model as the main method because a strict assumption of
the two-part model is that the choice of the recipient country is independent from the amount of
aid allocated to that country, meaning that the errors terms in each of two stages are unrelated.
This assumption generally does not hold since the decisions at the first stage are relevant to the
decisions made later on regarding the amount of aid. The violation of this strict assumption
will introduce a selection bias in the second step.
The tobit model gives unbiased and consistent estimators, and this paragraph will provide
statistical evidence. 1 We define the variable y∗ as a latent variable that is a linear function of
xi, and it can be expressed as: yi∗ = xiβ +ε, εi∼(0,σu2). Assume the variable yi is observed if
yi∗ is greater than zero; otherwise, and variable yi is equal to zero. For the corner solution case,
we observe the latent variable yi∗, but we are interested in properties of the distribution of yi,
which is the conditional distribution of yi∗. The expected value of the variable yi is shown as:
E(yi|xi) = E[yi∗|yi∗ > 0,xi]·P(yi∗ > 0|xi)+P(yi∗ = 0|xi)·0
= E[yi∗|yi∗ > 0,xi]·P(yi∗ > 0|xi).
Since ε is normally distributed,
E[yi∗|yi∗ > 0,xi] = xiβ+E[u|u >−xiβ]
= xiβ+σE[
u
σ
| u
σ
>
−xiβ
σ
]
= xiβ+σ[
φ(xβ/σ)
Φ(xβ/σ)
]
= xiβ+σλi,
where λi is known as the inverse of Mills Ratio. φ represents the probability density function
(pdf), and Φ denotes the cumulative density function (cdf). We assume that P(yi∗ > 0|xi) =
1Here we use the same notation as Wooldridge did in his book (2010).
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[1−Φ(−xiβ/σ)]. Plugging this equation into the equation of the expected value of the variable
yi, we can get:
E(yi|xi) = (xiβ+σλi)·[1−Φ(−xiβ/σ)]
= (xiβ+σλi)·Φxiβσ .
The equation above shows that the expected value E[yi|x] is a nonlinear function of x. The OLS
estimator is biased and inconsistent compared to the tobit estimator. The maximum likelihood
method is then used to estimate the model.
One of this paper’s objectives is to examine the factors that determine the U.S. food aid
shipments and how these determinants vary across regions and over time. Given our interest,
we specify the following model:
Yit = max(0,α+βXit + γi+λδt + εit) (5.1)
εit |Xit ,γi∼(0,σu2)
where Yit is the log of food aid quantity with a value of one added to preserve observations. Xit
is a vector of variables determining food aid. γi represents country unobserved heterogeneity.
δt is the time trend, and εit is the idiosyncratic error term.2 However, we cannot control for
country specific effects (γi) by including country fixed effects in the tobit model due to the
incidental parameters problem (Greene, 2004). Alternatively, we use the random effects tobit
method, which is the approach adopted by Young and Abbott (2008), Berthélemy and Tichit
(2004), and Canavire et al. (2006). A strong assumption of the random effects model is the
independency of Xit and γi, which is too difficult to satisfy. To relax this restrictive
assumption, we use the Mundlak-Chamberlain approach (Chamberlain, 1982; Mundlak, 1978)
and specify unobserved heterogeneity between recipient countries γi as a function of
2We control for time trends instead of time fixed effects due to the independent variable cereal production in
the U.S.. The variable cereal production in the U.S. only varies over time so that time fixed effects would capture
all variations in this variable. Alternatively, we use time trend variables to control for factors that consistently
affect food aid distributions over time, such as global price shocks.
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observables, γi = φ+ x¯ψ+υi. The assumption of the Mundlak-Chamberlain approach, which
assumes that unobserved heterogeneity γi is an explicit function of the means of x variables,
may be restrictive. This approach at least relaxes the assumption of exogeneity between
regressors and γi under the traditional random effects tobit model.Now, we can rewrite our
model as
Yit = max(0,α+βXit +φ+ x¯ψ+υi+λδt + εit) (5.2)
εit |Xit ,υi∼(0,σu2)
After adding individual means of time varying x-variables to to regression, we allow for non-
zero correlation between the random effects and the regressors.
As for the explanatory variables, we examine the determinants of food aid from two
aspects, supply-side factors from the donor’s perspective and demand-side factors from the
recipient’s perspective. For the donor country, the United States for instance, the political and
strategic consideration comes first. We use the variable alignment that measures countries’
voting similarity in the U.N. with the U.S. as a proxy for that country’s political alliance with
the U.S. It is generally believed that it is very likely for donors to give aid to their allies. We
include the U.S. military aid variable to see whether donors give preference to countries with
military-strategic interest. We also control for population, as the amount of food aid grows with
the size of a country. In addition, since the U.S. food aid program is initiated with the objective
to dispose surpluses, the decisions on food aid shipments are related to the food production in
the U.S. We control for cereal food production in the U.S. to address the possibility that more
food aid is distributed when production in the U.S. is sufficient.
From the recipient country’s perspective, humanitarian concerns or recipient’s needs are
considered as main forces driving the U.S. to ship food aid. Specifically, we include a country’s
income level and GDP per capita to see if the U.S. ships food aid to the poor countries that are
in need of aid. We also include a dummy variable lagged conflict to indicate whether a country
is suffering from conflict. This variable can be used to measure if the U.S. responds to disasters
that occurred in recipient countries. Finally, we control for the food production level in the
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recipient countries to study if production shocks are factors that affect food aid allocation.
5.2 Effects of Food Aid on Food Production
We are also interested in studying the impact of food aid on food production. The
regression specification is shown below,
Yit = α+βAidit−1+λXit−2+ τi+ϕt + εit (5.3)
where Yit is the quantity of food production measured in metric tons, Aidit−1 is the quantity of
food aid in metric tons (MT) at the period t-1, Xit represents a vector of exogenous variables
affecting food production, τi is a country fixed effect, ϕt is the time fixed effect, and εit is the
idiosyncratic error term. A full list of the explanatory variables is shown in the data section.
In addition, we take the logarithm of the dependent variable and the endogenous variable food
aid to make the distribution less skewed. Note that a value of one is added to food aid before
taking the logarithm to preserve observations.
If the United States gave aid in response to production shocks in the developing
countries, a concern surrounding reverse causality arises. Without any approach to address the
endogeneity problem, the coefficient of the variable of interest is biased and inconsistent.
The identification strategy implemented is the instrumental variable method 3. We
follow the methods of Nunn and Qian (2014b) and Dreher and Langlotz (2015), who
interacted time-variant excludable variables with the country’s probability of receiving aid. In
Nunn and Qian’s paper, they examined how U.S. food aid affects conflict in recipient
countries. Their identification strategy was to interact the U.S. wheat production in the
preceding year with the country’ s probability of receiving U.S. food aid. Following Nunn and
Qian’s method, Dreher and Langlotz (2015) studied the effect of foreign aid on economic
3The first stage of the 2SLS does not consider that the food aid variable is a corner solution. It is not a
big problem here because consistency of 2SLS estimation does not dependent on the correct specification in the
first-stage (Kelejian, 1971). Wooldridge (2002) also provided an approach to address the issue. He suggested to
use fitted probabilities from a first-stage tobit model as an instrument for the endogenous variable. We followed
Wooldridge’s approach, and the results are the same as the conventional 2SLS results.
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growth in a sample of 96 countries over the 1974-2009 period. They used donor government
fractionalization to capture the variations in donor countries’ aid shipments, relying on the
assumption that legislature fragmentation increases government expenditures (Scartascini and
Crain, 2002) and that larger government budgets increase aid budgets. They then introduced
variations at the recipient-country level by interacting fractionalization with the share of years
a country receives aid.
However, several concerns arise regarding the strategy used in the above two studies.
Firstly, in both studies, the authors used the fraction of years over the study period that a country
receives any U.S. food aid as one component of the instrument, which can be problematic. The
food aid variable is endogenous, so it is not convincing to assume that the mean of the indicator
variable of food aid over the sample period is exogenous. In addition, the mean value of the
propensity of receiving food aid in the second stage captures only the variations in the outcome
caused by either receiving or not food aid, instead of the absolute amount of food aid.
In this study, we use a three-way interaction term of U.S. wheat stocks, U.S. military
assistance, and a measurement of a country’ s alliance with the U.S. through its voting pattern
in the U.N. in the preceding year to instrument for food aid. Compared to Nunn and Qian’ s
identification strategy, our instrument improves precision. Instead of using U.S. wheat
production to capture the effects of surpluses on aid allocation, we use U.S. wheat stocks in
the preceding year to introduce variations over years. The variable U.S. wheat stocks is
directly related to the food aid flows, and thus it is unnecessary to assume that high wheat
production would increase wheat stocks. We also replace the propensity of receiving food aid
with the dollar amount of U.S. military aid to capture the intensity of the effect of food aid on
the outcome. We include the U.N. voting score in the instrument to capture the variations in
food aid receipts driven by political alignment considerations. The inclusion of the variable
alignment increases the first-stage significance.
Each component of the instrument is relevant to food aid flows. Since one of the
explicitly stated objectives of the U.S. food aid program is to dispose of surplus, we assume
higher U.S. wheat stocks in the preceding year would lead to a higher amount of U.S. wheat
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food aid in the following year. Due to the dominant proportion of U.S. wheat aid over the U.S.
food aid program, we also expect a larger amount of U.S. cereal food aid as a result of an
increased amount of wheat aid. We test these links by plotting bivariate relationships between
wheat stocks, wheat aid, and cereal aid. Figure 10-1 captures the positive relationships
between lagged U.S. wheat stocks and U.S. wheat aid delivered in year t. Figure 10-2 shows
that U.S. wheat aid is positively related to U.S. cereal aid delivered in year t.
U.S. wheat stocks are positively related to cereal aid shipments, but including U.S. wheat
stocks alone as the instrument is not feasible because all variations across countries can be
captured by year fixed effects in the regression. To keep the variations caused by fluctuations
in U.S. wheat stocks, we introduce the variations from the recipient-country side by interacting
country-specific characteristics, which are the U.S. military aid and the country’ s voting pattern
in the U.N.
The variable dollar amount of U.S. military aid and the variable voting score are
significant determinants of U.S. food aid. U.S. military aid is positively related to cereal aid
flows, shown in Figure 11-1. The bivariate coefficient is 0.22 and significant at 1%. This
indicates that food aid is often used together with military aid to achieve national security
objectives. In addition, Barrett and Maxwell (2006) argued that countries that have
experienced heavy intervention by U.S. armies are more likely to receive food aid as a way to
ease agitation. Furthermore, Figure 11-2 demonstrates that the alliance with the U.S. through
voting in the U.N. is also positively related to food aid. The United States tends to give food
aid to its allied countries. Raschky and Schwindt (2009) also instrumented foreign aid with
the voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly. They argued that it is common
for donor countries, including the U.S., to reward their political allies.
These variables are not only relevant but are also excludable, meaning that each
component of the instrument affects production only through its influence on food aid. Lagged
U.S. wheat production is a donor-country-based variable, and thus is considered as exogenous
since it is not related to recipient countries’ characteristics and therefore could not directly
affect domestic food production except through the food aid channel. A country’ s voting
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pattern in the U.N. is also excludable. One may be concerned about the possibility that U.S.
may deliver more non-food aid economic assistance to countries that are politically closer to
the United States. We thus include the U.S. non-food aid economic assistance in the
regression to control for the influences of the variable alignment on production via its impact
on other types of economic assistance. As for the third variable, dollar amounts of U.S.
military aid measured in logarithm, it also affects domestic production only through its
influence on U.S. food aid conditional on the explanatory variables. Other than the food aid
channel, it is also possible that the effects of military aid on production come through conflict.
Thus, we include a dummy variable of conflict in the regression to capture the differential
effects of U.S. military aid on production through the outbreaks of conflict.
In addition to controlling for the indicator of conflict, we provide additional evidence to
support the excludability of the variable U.S. military aid. U.S. military aid has been deployed
to support U.S. military-strategic interests over the long run, instead of in response to
outbreaks of conflict. For example, Greece and Turkey received large amounts of military aid
during the 1960s because of the Truman Doctrine, although no conflict in these two countries
outbroke during the same period. The U.S. gave millions of dollars in military aid to countries
threatened by Soviet communism and other anticommunist regimes throughout the world to
develop alliances against the Soviet Union. To some extent, U.S. military aid is driven by
American foreign policy and is not directly related to outbreaks of conflict. We check the
bivariate relationships between the existence of conflict and an indicator of receiving any
amount of U.S. military aid. The insignificant coefficient with a large p-value (0.14) indicates
that U.S. military aid is not significantly related to conflict. This means that we do not have
sufficient evidence to conclude that military aid is in response to outbreaks of conflict. U.S.
military aid is arguably excludable conditional on explanatory variables.
We discussed the validity of our instrument in the previous paragraphs. The
mathematical derivations of the IV method are shown below 4.
Let the vector Xit = (X1it ,X2it ...Xkit) be regressors where X1it is endogenous variable
4The notations and derivations are from Wooldridge (2010).
37
and Xkit is a vector of all excluded regressors. In our case, the variable food aid and food
production are endogenous given the presence of reverse causality. By definition, we know that
E[X1itu] 6= 0, and thus using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method could generate biased
and inconsistent estimators. One option is to use the IV fixed effect estimators, which can be
obtained by a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression. Compared to the OLS estimators,
the 2SLS estimators are consistent if the instrument is (1) relevant to endogenous variable, and
(2) uncorrelated with whatever is not observed that is a determinant of yi (Wooldridge, 2010).
There are two steps involved in getting the 2SLS estimator as what the name infers. In the first
stage, we strip from X1it that part of the variation that is uncorrelated to u, and we can get:
Xˆ = PzX (5.4)
where Pz = Z(Z′Z)−1Z′ and the vector Zit = (Z1it ,X2it ...Xkit). In the second stage, we use Xˆ
instead of X in our regression y = XˆβIV + v. Thus, the IV estimate is
ˆβIV = (X ′Z(Z′Z)−1Z′X)−1X ′Z(Z′Z)−1Z′y = (Z′X)−1Z′y (5.5)
The two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach is a common way to estimate IV
estimator, and the 2SLS estimator is also called the instrumental variables (IV) estimator or
the generalized instrumental variable estimator (GIVE). In this paper, we consider a more
general framework, which is an instrumental variable estimator implemented using the
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The 2SLS estimator is one type of GMM estimator
when the model is under conditional homoskedasticity. With robust standard errors, 2SLS
estimator is consistent but not efficient. Thus, GMM estimator is more efficient in the
presence of heteroskedasticity in the regression (Wooldridge, 2010).
Let’s revise the classical 2SLS approach from the GMM perspective. The principle of
the GMM approach is to choose the estimators of unknown parameters that force the sample
moment conditions to hold. The assumption that the instruments Z are orthogonal to error terms
can be shown as E(Ziui) = 0. The M instruments give us a set of M moments (M>K). Since
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each of the M moment equations maps one-to-one to a sample moment, we have the following
equation for sample moments
g¯(βˆ) =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
gi(βˆ) =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
Zi′(yi−Xiβˆ) = 1nZ′uˆ (5.6)
The goal is to get an estimator for β that makes g¯(βˆ) = 0.
If the equation is under exact identification, which means we have M moment conditions
for the M unknown parameters, we are able to get exact solutions that make g¯(βˆ) = 0. If
the equation is the overidentified case, where the moment conditions (M) is greater than the
number of parameters (K), it is impossible to use all moments to solve the problem, and thus
the objective of GMM is to choose β so g¯(βˆ) is close to zero. The GMM approach constructs an
M×M weighting matrix W to capture the possible weights assigned to each moment in order
to minimize g¯(βˆ). Thus, the objective function is shown as
F(βˆ) = ng¯(βˆ)′Wg¯(βˆ) (5.7)
Taking the first-order derivative to minimize the objective function, we can get the GMM
estimator below:
ˆβGMM = (X ′ZWZ′X)−1X ′ZWZ′y (5.8)
There are many GMM estimators depending on the form of the weighting matrix.
Hansen (1982) invented the optimal weighting matrix, which represented W as W = S−1 to
produce the most efficient estimator. The matrix S is shown as
S =
1
n
E[Z′uu′Z] =
1
n
E[Z′ΩZ] (5.9)
Knowing the consistent estimator S allows us to get the efficient GMM estimator, which is
ˆβEGMM = (X ′ZS−1Z′X)−1X ′ZS−1Z′y (5.10)
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In order to estimate S, it is necessary to know the form of Ω, which is the variance-
covariance matrix of the error. If the errors are independent and identically distributed (iid),
S = σu2IN and the optimal weighting matrix is the identity matrix. In this case, the IV-GMM
estimator is the same as the 2SLS estimator. If there is heteroskedasticity or errors exhibit
cluster correlation,
Sˆ =
M
∑
j=1
uˆ j′uˆ j (5.11)
where
uˆ j = (y j− x jβˆ)X ′Z(Z′Z)−1z j (5.12)
The IV-GMM estimates using this estimation of S will be robust to heteroskedasticity and
intra-cluster correlation. In our study, we expect the existence of heteroskedasticity because
it is likely that changes in the variance correspond to changes in explanatory variables. To
exclude the noise of heteroskedasticity, we will use the IV-GMM estimator.
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CHAPTER 6
DATA DESCRIPTION
This study uses a panel dataset consisting of 118 countries over the period 1961-2006.
The pattern of the data is an unbalanced panel from 1961-2006, and this is unbalanced due to
the dissolution and independence of several countries during this time period. The countries
of interest are developing countries with income levels varying from upper middle income,
lower middle income to low income levels, spreading out over six regions. These regions are
the following: East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean,
Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. These categorizations are
based on the World Bank’s regional classification. A full list of countries shows in Table 3. 1
The food aid datasets come from the USDA, and production data are from the Food and
Agricultural Organization’s statistical database (FAO-STAT). Other data on economic
conditions and recipient countries’ characteristics are gathered from various sources, which
will be described in details in the first subsection. All of these variables are merged together to
form our master dataset. The commodity of interest is the total cereal grains in metric tons.
Given that the FAOSTAT and USDA have different rules for standardizing and aggregating
data, we re-structure FAOSTAT production data to follow the hierarchy in the food aid dataset
so as to make these two datasets comparable. A detailed procedure of aggregation and
re-classification will be provided in the second subsection. In addition, we will discuss the
approach we used to select countries, followed by the method to address inconsistency
problem arising from different definitions for a country regarding whether the winning part of
a divided country represents the nation after unification or whether a brand new country with a
different identifier from former parts should be used. The ultimate goal of our clearing process
is to make variables comparable and consistent based on pre-determined "standards". Finally,
1Figure 12 shows a global map that highlighted these 118 countries. The areas of countries are shaded in
proportional to the quantities of local cereal production, and the size of dots represents the relative quantitative
values in food aid receipts.
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some data limitations will be discussed.
6.1 Variable Definitions
The food aid variable measures the total quantity of in-kind food aid delivered from the
U.S. to recipient countries. As long as food commodities are procured and dispatched from the
United States, these commodities can be categorized as in-kind food aid. This food aid variable
is an aggregation of Title I program aid, Title II emergency aid, and Title III project aid. The
unit of the variable is measured in metric tons (MT). Food aid data are from two sources. The
1955-1973 food aid data are manually digitized from the USDA report "Agricultural Exports
under Public Law 480" (1974). The 1972-2006 data come from the USDA-Foreign Agricultural
Service (FAS). We have overlapping information for 1972 and 1973 that come from different
sources. The data in these two files are quite consistent, and we keep food aid data in 1972 and
1973 from the USDA’s FAS. Given all efforts, food aid data for 1990 and 1991 are unavailable.
Production data come from the FAOSTAT, and are supplied by governments through
national publications, FAO questionnaires and international organizations and agencies. Data
contain production information on primary products over the calendar year. If the harvest of
crops takes place between years, production of a given commodity is allocated to the calendar
year in which most of harvest occurs. As regards production data for cereals, the yield number
is related to crops harvested for dry grain but not to crops harvested for hay, or grazing purposes.
(2012)
In addition to food aid and production data, we control for many other variables,
including precipitation, disasters, conflicts, trade openness, GDP, population, institutional
democracy, arable land (% of total land of a country), and U.S. economic aid (net of U.S. food
aid). The following paragraph illustrates the definition, data source and the possible impact on
food production for each controlled variable.
Precipitation data come from Climatic Research Unit at the Tyndall Centre (Mitchell
et al., 2004), and data measure the annual precipitation in millimeters from 1960-2000. The
42
remaining six years of data are computed using ArcMap from the dataset known as
"Terrestrial Air Temperature and Precipitation, Version 1.10" (Matsuura and Willmott, 2007),
which includes the monthly mean precipitation for grid-cells globally. Country boundary
shapefiles are used to obtain country-level precipitation. Since the geographic or altitude
differentiations may contribute to different volumes of rain, we standardize the volumes of
precipitation by subtracting the mean value from annual rainfall in order to obtain the
deviation from the mean. Given the summary statistics in Table 4, the mean value of the
rainfall deviations is -0.07mm.
In addition, data on disasters come from the EM-DAT International Disaster Database
from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) in Belgium (Guha-
Sapir, Below, and Hoyois, 2015). The variable is discrete with an increment of one along with
a outbreak of a disaster in a given year. In particular, six types of natural disasters are taken
into account. These are geo-physical, meteorological, hydrological, climatological, biological,
and extraterrestrial (very rare) disasters. In order for a disaster to be counted, the disaster must
have "at least ten casualties, affect at least one hundred people, and require a declaration of
a state-level emergency or call for international assistance" (Guha-Sapir, Below, and Hoyois,
2015). The mean value of this variable is 1.43. The largest number ever recorded was 37 in
2006 in China. Compared to other countries, the historical numbers of disasters for China were
relatively large, being around 9 in the 1980s and 17 in the 1990s and 2000s. The South Asian
region also has the highest mean number of disasters (3.8), followed by the East Asian and
Pacific region with the mean value of 2.9, as shown in Table 5. Middle Eastern and North
African countries have the lowest mean value for disasters, which is 0.76.
Climate conditions and natural disasters all have significant influences on agricultural
production. We can expect a negative impact to be produced by extremely large or small
precipitation on food production as well as a negative effect of disasters on production. More
specifically, Lobell, Schlenker, and Costa (2011) provided empirical evidence regarding the
impacts of climate variability on food production. Their study stated that abnormal changes in
climate from 1980 to 2008 reduced global production of wheat by 5.5% relative to a
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counterfactual without climate change. Given the evidence of the impact of climate conditions
on food production, especially cereals whose growth is highly reliant on weather, it is
important to control for precipitation. In addition, disasters can heavily affect agricultural
production. A FAO’s study (2015) shows that the agriculture sector retains 22 percent of the
aggregated financial losses created by disasters. Within the agriculture sector, 42 percent of
harm is burdened by the crop sub-sector. Thus, cereal production can be severely affected by
natural disasters, particularly by floods, storms and droughts.
The conflict data come from the UCDP-PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (version 4-2014a)
(Therese and Wallensteen, 2015), where the definition of a conflict refers to the use of armed
force that results in at least 25 battle deaths annually. A conflict can be an intrastate, interstate,
or extra-systemic conflict. The conflict variable in this paper is a dummy variable, and is used
to capture the outbreak of any type of conflict in a country. The mean value of this variable
is 0.25. South Asian countries have the largest mean value of the outbreaks of conflict (0.52)
while European and Central Asian countries have the smallest mean value (0.09).
We expect conflict to produce a negative impact on food production, since conflicts can
lead to the deterioration of farmers’ incentives to produce food by disturbing the output food
market as well as input food market. Rebels in conflict regions are likely to destroy or seize food
stocks. The isolation of the combat zones from surrounding areas can prevent local farmers
from getting access to input resources and transporting products to local markets. In addition,
young labor force in the families may join the troops voluntarily or involuntarily. Such a labor
supply shortage can lead to a reduction in food production. Another way in which conflicts
lead to food shortages is through the use of landmines. Landmines contains toxic waste, which
can pollute agricultural terrains and disrupt soil quality. This concern prevents farmers from
relying on these fields for sustenance (Messer and Cohen, 2007).
The data on GDP, trade openness, and population are from the Penn World Tables
(version 6.3). GDP is measured in terms of per capita and are measured in terms of constant
2005 U.S. dollars. Openness equals exports plus imports over GDP, which indicates the
intensity of international trade. The variable openness is measured at 2005 U.S. dollars. The
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population variable is measured in thousands. The summary statistics for regions (Table 5)
show that countries in Europe and Central Asia have the largest mean of the variable GDP per
capita. By contrast, Sub-Saharan African countries are relatively poor. Middle Eastern and
North African countries are intensively involved in international trade due to the largest mean
value being the trade variable of openness. South Asian as well as East Asian and Pacific
countries have the highest population on average during the 1961-2006 period.
Our expectation is that GDP, trade openness, and population are all positively correlated
with food production. A country with a high gross domestic production indicator can be
expected to exhibit better economic performance in the manufacturing, industrial and
agricultural sectors. In addition, a high GDP country generally has advanced technology,
which can stimulate growth in agricultural growth. Similarly, a nation with a large population
can generally be expected to have affluent labor supply, which can benefit the labor-intensive
agricultural sector. As regards the influence of trade, research has shown that countries which
have embraced globalization and increasing openness to the international exchange of goods
and services are more likely to introduce new ideas and technologies, which can result in a
high growth rate compared to countries that are less open to the rest of the world (Andersen
and Babula, 2008). To some extent, international trade can serve as a buffer that can mitigate
the impact of shocks on national production. Countries can export more products when food
supply is excessive while importing more from abroad when food shortages prevail, in order
to stabilize domestic food levels.
Institutional democracy data come from the Polity Data Archive, which was initially
published by Gleditsch in the Department of Government at the University of Essex
Colchester in 2003. The data we used are the fourth version, which was modified in 2008, and
contain longitudinal data on the characteristics of nations’ political regime. The democracy
variable takes on integer values, ranging from 0 (the least democratic) to 10 (the highest level
of democracy). The measurement of democracy involves three perspectives: the
competitiveness of government official elections, the completeness of legislation, and the
easiness of the shift of political power. The average value of this variable is 2.72. Sub-Saharan
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African, and Middle Eastern and North African countries have low democracy indicators on
average. Political democracy in a nation is believed to have a positive influence on agricultural
production. This is because the political environment in a democratic country is more friendly
to well-being policies, and thus creates favorable conditions for achieving food security (Sen,
1981; Sen and Dreze, 1989).
Arable land data are from the FAOSTAT, which measure the percentage of arable land
divided by total land areas. The mean value is 0.16, as shown in Table 4. Larger amounts of
farming land can be expected to increase production, subject to the production technology and
weather shocks.
U.S. economic assistance and U.S. military aid data come from the U.S. Overseas Loans
and Grants (Greenbook), and were prepared by USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services
on March 28, 2014. The dataset contains the amount of assistance (current dollars) provided by
a given program to a country in a particular year. Using the purchasing power parity provided
in the Penn State Tables, the value is converted into constant U.S. dollars using a base year
of 2005. The mean values of U.S. economic assistance and U.S. military aid are 767000 and
562000 thousand dollars, respectively. East Asian and Pacific countries as well as Middle
Eastern and North African countries received more U.S. military aid on average. Countries in
Middle East and North Africa as well as in South Asia received more non-food aid economic
assistance.
The economic aid variable includes all types of economic aid provided by the United
States, except for food aid so as to avoid double accounting. The positive relationship between
economic aid and food production is not hard to depict. Many aid programs, such as the Food
for Education programs, seek to improve literacy and reduce hunger by encouraging school
attendance and promoting food production.
Producer price data come from three sources. The FAO website provides data for
producer farmgate prices measured in terms of the U.S. dollar during the period of 1991 to
2014. The FAO Archive contains producer price data prior to 1991, with measurements given
in terms of the local currency. We convert the units from the local currencies to U.S. dollars
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using the exchange rate provided in the PWT. However, the exchange rates for some countries
in particular years were extremely small due to measurement error, and thus generated large
producer prices. In order to ensure that data on producer prices are reliable, we replace
producer prices with missing values if producer prices exceed 10000 U.S. dollars. Finally, we
use producer price data from Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) as a supplementary data source.
His dataset entailed 97 relatively large countries, and had limited coverage of countries
compared to the FAO dataset. Anderson’s dataset only supplements 133 observations that the
FAO data are missing.
6.2 Re-mapping FAO Data
The challenge is to make food aid and FAO production data comparable. The problem
is that FAO production data contain different categories of commodities with various
processed levels from commodities in food aid datasets. In general, FAO production data are
more disaggregated than food aid data. To make these datasets comparable, a re-classification
of FAO commodities is necessary by mapping the FAO commodity codes into the codes used
in food aid data. The principle is that each FAO product code is assigned just one aid code at
the lowest possible level of aggregation. Using this method allows FAO production data to
have the same structure as food aid data.
Table 6 shows the structure of food aid data with one food aid code for each
commodity. More specifically, the structure of food aid data is hierarchical and has four
aggregation levels. The top-level commodity groups are the most aggregated. They contain
eight categories of commodities, which are animal and animal products, grains and
preparations, fruits and preparations, vegetables and preparations, oilseed products, tobacco,
cotton excluding linters, and other. Within each top-level commodity group, commodities are
further categorized into three levels based on processed levels.
Similarly, FAO trade data and FAO food balance sheets are all restructured to maintain
the same hierarchy as food aid data. After the transformation, different FAO datasets all contain
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the same products in each category. Thus, the top-level aggregated commodity items provide
us with consistent and comparable estimates of data for further analysis.
6.3 Country Selection
The complete number of countries and territories in the data set is 236, including
countries that are of interest in this study and those that are not. This paragraph below
summarizes the criteria we used to select countries. We exclude high-income and small
population countries based on the data for 1954, as well as countries with no production data
and food aid data throughout the whole sample period. We use countries’ characteristics
(population and income levels) prior to the implementation of U.S. food aid programs when
characteristics are exogenous to food aid programs. Once food aid programs commenced,
food aid might affect countries’ characteristics, resulting in bias if selection was based on data
from later years.
First, we drop high-income countries. The World Bank provides country classifications
by income based on estimates of GNI per capita. Four income groups are low-income,
lower-income, upper-income, and high-income groups. The thresholds for inclusion in income
groups were established in 1987 with an explicit benchmark of $6000 per capita for
high-income countries (World Bank, 2016). To extrapolate the thresholds in 1954, we use the
SDR deflator, which is also the current methodology used by the World Bank, to adjust for
inflation. Since the historical SDR deflator data starts in 1960, it is not possible to obtain the
income group thresholds for 1954. We use the threshold for the high-income group in 1960
($869) as an approximation for the threshold in 1954. Based on this criterion, we drop 41
high-income countries 2.
We then use the population data for 1954 from the Penn World Table to drop countries
with extremely small populations. The threshold of population for small countries used in
2American Samoa, Aruba, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Bermuda, Brunei, Canada,
Denmark, Faroe, Finland, France, Germany, Greenland, Guam, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland , Isle of Man, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Qatar, Saudia Arabia, Singapore, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Us Virgin, West Germany.
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this paper originated with Salvatore, Svetlicic, and Damijan (2016), who defines extremely
small nations as those having populations of less than 1 million. Given that countries that have
extremely small populations are of little economic significance, we excluded 47 countries 3
that had less than 1 million people in 1954. In addition, there were 5 countries 4 for which
population data for 1954 were not available but which should be considered to be extremely
small countries. We excluded those 5 countries as well.
Finally, 25 countries 5 have no food aid and food production data during the sample
period. These countries are excluded from the sample. FAO production data for the former
Soviet Union countries began in 1992, whereas the food aid data for those countries began in
1991. We drop these observations in 1991. In the results section, we show that the analysis
results do not change if we kept data for the former Soviet Union countries in 1991. We are left
with 118 countries in the sample.
6.4 Country Definition
Several countries dissolved and reunited over the course of history. These changes pose
difficulties for our analysis because different datasets use different methods to record changes
that have occurred in the country. In order to ensure that data from various sources has the
same country-year structure, we use the criteria below to standardize the list of countries.
The United States delivered food aid to some regimes even before they became
independent and world-recognized countries. We consider the initial year of these countries to
be those in which they first received U.S. food aid in order to preserve more food aid data.
Otherwise, we consider the initial year of a country to be when the U.S. recognized the
3Antigua Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Botswana, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus,
Djibouti, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Grenada, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Jordan, Kiribati,
Lesotho, Liberia, Macau, Maldives, Malta, Marshall, Mauritius, Micronesia, Mongolia, Namibia, Oman, Palau,
Panama, Samoa, Sao Tomme Principe, Seychelles, Solomon, St. Kitts Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent Grenadines,
Suriname, Swaziland, Timor Leste, Tonga, Trinidad, Tobago, Vanuatu.
4French Guiana, Montserrat, New Caledonia, Pacific Trust, Reunion Is.
5Andorra, British Virgin, Cayman Islands, Cocos, Cook Islands, East Germany, French Polynesia,
Liechtenstein, Martinique, Monaco, Nauru, Niue, Norfolk, North Vietnam, San Marino, St. Helena, St. Pierre
Miquelon, Tokelau, Tuvalu, Wallis Futuna, Guadeloupe, Netherlands Antilles, Palestine, South Yemen, Western
Sahara.
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independence of the country. In addition, we decide to adopt the approach used in the Polity
IV dataset to recode countries as new countries after major changes, e.g., a new code was
generated for Yemen after unification (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr, 2010). An alternative
method was developed by Gleditsch and Ward (1997), who considered the "winning" country
to be a continuation. For example, after Yemen’s reunification, the South Yemen code ceases
to be used to designate that country and the North Yemen code continues. In this paper, we
choose to use the Policy IV approach to standardize different approaches used in the
UCDP-PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and the Policy Data Achieve.
Furthermore, together with the names of recipient countries, ISO3, COWid, and FAOid
are also identifiers we used to merge country-specific characteristics, policy-related data, and
FAO data into the recipient country-year master files. ISO alpha-3 codes are three-letter country
codes published by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). COWid stands
for the Correlates of War country ID. FAOid is the country identifier used by the FAOSTAT.
These country identifiers are extremely useful for identification purposes during the process of
merging when the country name is missing.
6.5 Limitations
The limitations of data derive from the intrinsic nature of data itself. Several variables
have missing values due to a comprehensive coverage of countries over the course of a long
period of time. These variables include deviation of precipitation, openness score, real GDP
per capita, democracy score and voting score. As regards the variable precipitation, several
countries have missing values for consecutive years before 2000. For other variables,
missingness seems to spread out across countries, and many countries have missing values
only for one or a few years. No clear patterns in the missingness can be found, and the number
of missing observations is relatively small compared to the total number of observations. Due
to difficulties in finding the missing data from different sources, we decide to ignore
observations with missing values.
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In addition, the other intrinsic drawback of the data is that they only contain the total
aggregated food aid data, and thus the composition of Title I and Title II aid is unknown. The
lack of this piece of information restricted us from exploring the differences in the impacts of
various titles of food aid on production, although studying the determinants of aid allocation
allows us to make inferences about the relative proportion of each title of food aid.
Finally, the discrepancy in when the record of a country starts introduces inconsistency.
Our approach, as discussed above, is to recognize a country when the U.S. recognizes its
independence or when the country first received U.S. food aid if receiving food aid occurred
before the independence of the country. However, the FAO organizes production data
according to when the U.N. recognizes a country. This results in several countries being in the
FAO production data but not the U.S. food aid dataset because the U.N. recognizes the country
while the U.S. does not. These countries are relatively small in terms of country size and
population, and many of them are dropped from the selection of "eligible" countries. We
address this issue by using the FAO’s country-year records and assuming that the U.S. shipped
no food aid during the gap period where the U.N. recognizes the country but the U.S. has not
yet done so. This may introduce measurement error, and modifications are made to a limited
number of countries.
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CHAPTER 7
RESULTS
7.1 Determinants of U.S. Food Aid
Baseline Estimates
Table 7 summarizes the findings of food aid determinants for all recipient countries from
1961 to 2006. Column 1 shows the OLS estimates. Column 2 displays the random effects tobit
estimates using the maximum-likelihood method. We control for unobserved heterogeneity
among countries in the regression. The marginal effects at the mean are reported in Column 3.
Finally, the estimates using the Mundlak-Chamberlain approach and the marginal effects at the
mean are shown in Columns 4 and 5, respectively.
The results are similar under all specifications. Food aid shipments are responsive to
donor political interests as well as recipient countries’ needs. The coefficient of the one-year
lagged U.S. cereal production is positive and is significant at the 10% level. This implies
that the U.S. gives more cereal aid in a particular year if last year’s cereal production was
large. However, U.S. cereal production does not have a contemporaneous effect on food aid
allocation. This finding supports the surpluses-disposal objective of food aid in the U.S., which
involves shipping surpluses that were excessive stocks left from the previous year. In addition,
countries with similar voting patterns in the U.N. General Assembly as the U.S. are more likely
to receive food aid. This indicates that the U.S. uses food aid as an instrument to reward
its political allies. The coefficient of the variable military aid is significantly positive. Two
possible explanations can explain this positive estimate: the U.S. may use food aid to mitigate
the tension in areas receiving a large amount of military aid, or it may use soldiers to deliver
food aid, counting the expenditures incurred in the process of transportation as military aid
expenses.
With regard to recipient countries, the results in Table 7 show that countries that have a
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large population, lower GDP per capita, and conflicts and disasters are likely to receive more
cereal aid. The signs of these variables are within our expectations that the U.S. ships more aid
to populous and poor countries as well as those countries suffering from disasters and conflicts.
The results confirm that U.S. food aid allocation is also on the basis of recipient needs to
some extent. Furthermore, the coefficients of local cereal production at year t and at year t-1
are significantly negative. This implies that U.S. cereal aid allocation is partially driven by
cereal production shortfalls in recipient countries. However, the insignificance of the variable
democracy score indicates that the U.S. does not seem to deliver more food aid to democratic
governments. Food aid allocation is irrelevant to policy performance of the recipient countries.
Food Aid Allocation Before and After 1990
We separate the sample into pre-1990 and post-1990 groups to examine if determinants
of food aid allocation changed. We use the year 1990 as the divider because the U.S. explicitly
stated the promotion of food security as one of its objectives in 1990. Table 8 displays the
marginal estimates at the mean using the Mundlak-Chamberlain approach. Column 1 displays
the estimates using the whole sample period for comparison. Before 1990, the coefficient of
the one-year lagged U.S. cereal production is significantly positive at the 1% confidence level,
as shown in Column 2. However, the U.S. cereal production level does not seem to influence
food aid allocation after 1990, as shown in Column 3. This change is not surprising because
U.S. cereal stocks drained after 1990, and thus cereal aid was not driven by surplus disposal
anymore. In regards to the cereal production level in recipient countries, prior to 1990, the
U.S. seemed to respond to production shortfalls by delivering more food aid in the following
year, but this was not the case after 1990. Although the correlation between aid flows and
production shortfalls in recipient countries after 1990 is insignificant, the variable disaster is
statistically significant in the post-1990 period. This indicates that the U.S. tends to give food
aid to countries that experience disasters in the same year. The change in the variable disaster
from an insignificant to significant factor is consistent with a shift in the objective of the U.S.
food aid program to respond to humanitarian needs on the basis of the US’s political interests.
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In spite of some changes in the determinants of food aid before and after 1990, some
similarities exist in the patterns of food aid allocation. The variable democracy is insignificant
in all time periods. The variable conflict is also statistically insignificant in the pre- and
post-1990 periods, although the coefficient of this variable is significantly negative at the 10%
significance level using the full sample.
Food Aid Allocation by Regions
We divide countries by regions and run the regression for each region. Table 9 reports
the marginal estimates at the mean using the baseline specification. The variables U.S. cereal
production at year t and t-1 are significant for Sub-Saharan African countries. This indicates
that food aid to Sub-Saharan African countries is partially driven by U.S. cereal production
surpluses. As for the variable cereal production in recipient countries, a negative coefficient
can be found except for countries in East Asia and the Pacific as well as Middle East and
North Africa. Compared to the production shortfalls in these two regions, other factors, such
as disasters in the East Asian and Pacific region and the amount of military aid in the Middle
Eastern and North African regions, are more prominent and attract more food aid distributions.
In addition, the European and Central Asian as well as South Asian countries with high U.S.
voting alignment seem to receive more food aid. Surprisingly, the coefficient of the variable
GDP per capita is positive for Sub-Saharan African countries, while this variable is negatively
related to food aid flows for countries in other regions.
Patterns in the Allocation of Other Food Aid Commodities
All the analysis above focused on the patterns of U.S. cereal food aid allocation. In
addition to cereal food aid, the U.S. ships animal products (mainly dry milk powder) and
oilseed products (mainly soybean oilseeds) as food aid. Table 10 shows the results for the
determinants of animal and oilseed products from 1960 to 2006. The coefficient of the
variable local production of animal products at t-1 is positive, whereas the coefficient of the
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variable oilseed production in recipient countries at t-1 is negative. This implies that animal
product food aid seems to be less relevant to shortfalls in production of animal-related
commodities. One similarity in the distribution among these three types of food aid is that
U.S. production of these commodities is positively related to food aid flows in the subsequent
year. This result indicates that animal product and oilseed food aid are partially driven by the
surpluses-disposal objective as well.
This finding is in line with the U.S. domestic farm policy. In 1930, the U.S.
implemented the Dairy Price Support Program to purchase excessive dairy products, including
butter, cheddar cheese, and dry milk powder, on the open market to stabilize prices (Sumner
and Balagtas, 2002). The CCC was in charge of purchasing, and the excessive products were
stored in the government reserves. In addition, the U.S. government provided direct subsidies
for U.S. exporters of dairy products. Subsidized exports, together with food aid donations,
were used to dispose of surpluses of dairy commodities obtained under the price support
program. Similar to dairy products, the U.S. government implemented a price support
program and provided subsidies for oilseed producers and exporters. Oilseed food aid, thus,
was shipped in order to dispose of excessive stocks.
Discussion
Before moving to the results of impacts on production, we summarize the patterns of
U.S. food aid allocation and compare our findings to previous studies. Similar to many studies,
we find that U.S. food aid allocation is driven by donor’s interests and recipient countries’
needs. From the donor’s perspective, the U.S. is likely to give food aid to its political allies and
countries with military-strategic importance for it. In contrast, Neumayer (2005) concluded
that military-strategic interests did not seem to be a factor that affected U.S. food aid allocation
in the 1990s. The differentiation may come from the difference in time period. In our study,
military interests do not seem to be significant when we restrict the sample to observations in
the 1990s. We also conclude that food aid is positively related to U.S. production with a one-
year lag, which is consistent with findings in Nunn and Qian’s paper (2014). They found that
55
U.S. cereal food aid is partially driven by U.S. cereal production surpluses. Although grains
are the main food aid commodities, the U.S. delivers other food aid commodities in addition
to grains. Extending the types of food aid commodities, we also test if animal products and
oilseeds are used as food aid to dispose of surpluses. Our findings confirm the hypothesis that
surplus disposal is one of determinants for cereal, animal product, and oilseed food aid.
From the recipient country’s perspective, the U.S. is likely to deliver more food aid to
populous, poor, disaster-prone, and conflict-affected countries. Furthermore, U.S. food aid
responds to contemporaneous production shortfalls as well as to production shocks with a
one-year lag in recipient countries. This finding indicates a possibility of reverse causality
between food aid flows and domestic production, and thus justifies the use of the instrumental
variable method to isolate one effect from the other in the following section. The insignificant
determinant in our study is democracy, which is considered a significant factor of foreign aid
in many papers (Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004; Alesina and Dollar, 2000). Countries that have
a higher level of democratic progress usually attract more foreign aid but not food aid from the
U.S.
Comparing observations before and after 1990, we find that domestic surpluses were an
influential factor prior to 1990 while humanitarian concerns were significant after 1990. Ball
and Johnson (1996) studied the objectives behind the different titles of food aid and concluded
that the determinants of Title I and Title II food aid matched their stated objectives, that is
to say that Title I food aid is primarily driven by surpluses-disposal and political interests,
whereas Title II food aid is targeted to fulfill the humanitarian needs of recipient countries. To
analyze our findings one step further, the changes in the objectives indicate a shift in the relative
proportion of Title I and Title II food aid over the total amount, from Title I being dominant
before 1990 to Title II after 1990. For policy-makers and researchers, it is important to know
which types of food aid dominate during the time period of interest because different titles of
food aid may have different impacts on the outcomes.
Finally, we conclude that the patterns of U.S. food aid allocation across regions are
different. Sub-Saharan African countries are of particular interest because many SSA nations
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rely heavily on food aid. We find that the U.S. is likely to deliver more food aid to relatively rich
SSA countries as well as to SSA countries that experience production shocks. Some previous
studies Nunn and Qian (2014a); Young and Abbott (2008) confirm that food aid given to SSA
countries is partially driven by production shocks, but none of these studies explicitly discussed
the income levels of the recipient countries. The fact that the U.S. ships food aid to relatively
rich instead of poor SSA countries poses a question of how efficient the targeting is. It remains
unclear as to whether the U.S. intentionally shipped food aid to rich SSA countries or food
aid was ended up with rich SSA countries due to the poor targeting, and thus more research is
needed.
7.2 The Effects of Food Aid on Production
Three-way Interaction Instrument
The first column of Table 11 shows the OLS estimates. We include a set of covariates as
well as country and year fixed effects to account for omitted variable bias. The OLS estimate
of the variable log (U.S. cereal aid) is -0.01 and is significant at the 5% significance level. The
interpretation of the negative coefficient is ambiguous due to the presence of simultaneity bias
in the regression. This negative coefficient might indicate that U.S. cereal aid reduces cereal
production in recipient countries or that the U.S. gives more aid to countries that experience
production shocks. In order to separate the two effects from each other, we adopt the
instrumental variable method.
Columns 2-4 in Table 11 summarize the findings of the two-stage least square (2SLS)
estimates. We use a three-way interaction among the quantities of U.S. wheat stocks, the dollar
amount of U.S. military aid, and the alignment with the U.S. in the preceding year as the
instrument for the quantities of U.S. cereal aid. All of the regressions include baseline controls.
The first stage Keibergen-Paap F-statistic is 17. Since this number exceeds 10, which is the
commonly agreed-upon benchmark for a strong instrument, we are less concerned about weak
instrument bias. The point estimate of the instrument in the first stage is 0.00099, and this is
57
statistically significant at the 0.01 level of confidence. Consider the case of a country which
received the sample mean amount of military aid of $7.2 measured in logarithm and had the
mean U.N. voting score of 0.24 one year prior to receiving food aid. A 1000 metric tons
increase in the U.S. cereal stocks could have led to a 17 MT (7.2× 0.24× 0.0099× 1000)
increase in the amount of cereal aid received in the following year.
In the reduced form, the coefficient of the instrument is -0.00061. This is significant at
the 0.001 confidence level (Column 3 of Table 11). This indicates that for the same country
discussed in the above paragraph that received the mean value of military aid and had the mean
voting score, a 1000 MT increase in the U.S. cereal stocks two years previously would decrease
cereal production by 0.61% this year.
Dividing the coefficient of the instrument in the reduced form by the coefficient in the
first stage gives the two stage least square estimate, as shown in the fourth column of Table
11. The results support the hypothesis that cereal food aid negatively affects cereal production.
The 2SLS estimate of the variable log (U.S. cereal aid) is -0.062 and is significant at the 1%
level. This suggests that if the U.S. were to double cereal aid, cereal production in recipient
countries would decrease by 6.2%. Disaggregating cereal aid into three main types of grains,
which are wheat, rice, and feed grains, Columns 5-7 of Table 11 show that the effects of cereal
aid on production are primarily driven by wheat and feed grains.
One limitation of measuring quantities of cereal aid in terms of metric tons is that there
is no differentiation among different types of grains. In reality, one metric ton of wheat is worth
more than one metric ton of rice from the nutritional perspective. This is the case because wheat
provides more calories than rice given the same quantities in metric tons. In order to examine
the effects of cereal aid on production using caloric measurements, we use the FAO convertor
to transform the unit of aid from metric tons to calories.
Column 8 in Table 11 shows the estimates using caloric measurements, and the
regression includes the above instrument and baseline controls. The magnitudes and
significance levels for the exogenous independent variables are similar to those in the
regression with the variables being measured in metric tons. However, the 2SLS estimate of
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the variable of interest, meaning cereal aid in terms of calories during the previous year, is
-0.032. This estimate is less than that (-0.062) under the specification of using metric tons as
the unit. The coefficient remains statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. This result
is consistent with the results measured in metric tons and implies that U.S. cereal food aid can
lead to a reduction in cereal production during the following year in recipient countries.
Two-way Interaction Instrument
We use the interaction term between the U.S. wheat stocks and the amount of the U.S.
military aid measured in logarithm in the previous year as the instrument for the following
year’s cereal aid. The estimates appear in Table 12. The findings are similar to the estimates
shown in Table 11, except for smaller point estimates of the instrument in the first stage and
the reduced form. The coefficient of the instrument in the first stage is statistically significant
and equals 0.0026, as shown in the first column of Table 12. It is consistent with the hypothesis
that U.S. food aid allocation is positively correlated with U.S. military aid. This means that
countries that received a large amount of military aid have a propensity to receive more U.S.
food aid than countries that received a small amount of military aid, in years when wheat stocks
were sufficient relative to years when wheat stocks were in shortage. In addition, the first stage
Keibergen-Paap F-statistic is 11, which exceeds 10 but is less than the F-statistic in the first
stage when using the three-way interaction instrument.
The third column of Table 12 shows that the 2SLS estimate under this specification is
also similar to the 2SLS estimate reported in Table 11. The coefficient is equal to -0.056, which
is significant at the 5% confidence level. The negative sign of the estimate supports hypothesis
that there are disincentive effects of food aid on food production, which is consistent with
the results in Table 11. Compared to the three-way interaction instrument, using the interacted
instrument allows for the preservation of 98 more observations because these observations have
missing values in the variable alignment. After restricting the number of observations down to
3531, column 5 of Table 12 shows that there is no significant difference between the results in
the restricted sample (Column 5) and unrestricted sample (Column 3).
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In conjunction with the results in Table 11, the 2SLS estimates in Table 12 provide
evidence of the negative effects of cereal aid on cereal production. We address the issue of
simultaneity bias in the model using the instrument for the endogenous variable food aid.
However, given a higher first stage Keibergen-Paap F-statistic in the regression with the
three-way interaction instrument, we decide to use this instrument along with the baseline
controls for the following regressions. Note that we also use the interacted instrument for all
tests and the results are robust regardless of which instrument is used.
Lagged Dependent Variable
In the previous discussion, we did not control for the lagged dependent variable in the
regression. In the real world, however, food production is persistent in a manner such that
last year’s production is correlated with this year’s food production. This is usually the case
because many factors, such as droughts and the soil quality, may last more than one year and
affect production persistently. Year-end stocks of grains may have an impact on food market
in the following year. In addition, the persistence of food production is likely due to the local
crop rotation system, which involves changes in the planting of certain crops over the years.
To incorporate this fact into the model, we add the one-year lagged cereal production on
the right-hand side of the regression. Columns 1-3 of Table 13 shows the estimates using the
instrumental variable method with country and year fixed effects. The third column of Table
13 shows that the 2SLS estimate of the variable cereal aid is still significantly negative, but the
magnitude of the coefficient is smaller than that without controlling for the lagged dependent
variable. This is reasonable because the coefficient of the instrument in the reduced form
decreases, although the estimate in the first stage is similar to the estimate in the regression
without lagged production. By considering one-year lagged production, doubling U.S. cereal
food aid may lead to a 2.3% decrease in cereal production for the following year. The estimate
of the lagged dependent variable is 0.55, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. The
positive sign of this estimate confirms the hypothesis that production for the last year positively
affects the current year’s production.
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However, controlling for the lagged dependent variable in a fixed effect model
introduces the Nickell Bias in the reduced form, which arises because the demeaning process
or the first-difference process creates correlations between regressors and the error term. To
address the Nickell Bias, we use the Arellano-Bond method. The results are shown in Column
4 of Table 13. More specifically, we use the second lag of the dependent variable as the
instrument for the one-year lagged dependent variable. We do this because the AR (2) statistic
is insignificant, which indicates that there is no autocorrelation between the error term in t and
in t-2. The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable decreases to 0.14, although the
estimate is statistically significant. The estimate of the variable food aid is -0.015, which is
slightly smaller than the estimate reported in column 3 in terms of magnitude. Column 5 of
Table 13 shows the estimates of variables as measured in calories. Cereal aid is still negatively
related to cereal production in the following year, and other estimates are similar to estimates
in the regression with metric tons as the unit of measure in Column 4, although the magnitude
of cereal aid is reduced to -0.0069. The results are consistent with the findings in Column 8 of
Table 11 such that the extent of the disincentive effect of food aid is smaller when the
variables are measured in calories instead of metric tons in the regressions with and without
controlling for the lagged dependent variable. This indicates that recipient countries tend to
reduce production for relatively low-calorie crops while receiving high-calorie cereal aid from
the U.S.
In sum, the effects of cereal aid on production remain significantly negative under all
specifications, although the magnitudes of the coefficient differ depending on whether or not
we control for the lagged dependent variable. In comparison with the model without the
lagged dependent variable, controlling for one-year lagged cereal production generates a
smaller coefficient in terms of the magnitude in the fixed effects model. The magnitude of this
coefficient is similar to that in the regression with adjustment for the Nickell Bias. One
possible explanation for this might be that lagged production is an important explanatory
variable for current year’s production. When we control for the lagged dependent variable in
the regression, we are less likely to have omitted variable bias. We thus consider the
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Arellano-Bond model with variables measured in terms of metric tons as the optimum
specification so far. The coefficient of -0.015 means that, when the U.S. increases the amount
of food aid by a mean value of 70832 MT, the average reduction in production is around
173952 MT (0.015 × 11596800).
Validity of The Instrument
We now provide supporting evidence regarding the validity of the instrument.
Restrictively speaking, a valid instrument must pass the relevance and exogeneity tests. The
significant coefficient of the instrument in the first stage allows us to state the relevance
between the instrument and endogenous variable. As regards the exogeneity requirement, the
method section includes the justification for exogeneity. In addition, we conduct additional
tests to verify the validity of the instrument.
The variable food aid is endogenous because domestic production is one determinant of
food aid allocation, which is shown in Table 7. Here, we also conduct the Hausman test to
test the endogeneity of the variable food aid. A key assumption of the Hausman test is that
the 2SLS estimate is unbiased. By testing whether the difference between the 2SLS estimate
and OLS estimate approximates zero, the Hausman test provides the inference regarding the
endogeneity of the variable food aid. The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is exogeneity. A
very small p-value (0.0003) suggests that cereal food aid is highly endogenous with regard to
cereal production, after including all of the control factors. Again, the result of Hausman test
justifies the use of the instrumental variable method only if the 2SLS estimate is unbiased.
One concern regarding the validity of the instrument arises due to the ambiguity in the
time lag between sufficient stocks and food aid shipments. When using the current instrument,
we assume that the U.S. would ship more food aid during the current year if stocks in the last
year were sufficient. This assumption is fairly strong. It is possible that if the U.S. ships food aid
at the end of the current year, then this year’s wheat stocks will have contemporaneous effects
on food aid shipments. In order to test the sensitivity of the choice of the lags with respect to
the results, Columns 1-3 of Table 14 show the first-stage estimates when the variable wheat
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stocks is lagged by one, two, and three years. The other two components of the instrument
still have two-year lags. The results show that the instrument is significant in the first-stage
under all three circumstances. Although the assumption that food aid is positively related to
last year’s wheat stocks is restrictive, relaxing this assumption does not change the significance
of the instrument.
In addition, Column 4 of Table 14 provides the first-stage estimates when we replace
U.S. wheat stocks with feed grain stocks. The new instrument is also significant in the first
stage. The significance is not surprising because feed grain aid constitutes the second largest
type of grains delivered as food aid, exceeded only by wheat. Together with military aid and
voting similarity scores, variations in feed grain stocks can capture some variations in cereal
food aid as well. Given that the first stage F statistic of the new instrument is smaller than the F
statistic of the equation that uses wheat stocks as one component of the instrument, we prefer
to use the instrument that includes wheat stocks.
Lastly, we lag the instrument by two and three years, and then use the instrument at
periods t and t+1 for the endogenous variable at t-1. The first-stage estimates in Column 5 and
6 are insignificant, meaning that the instrument could be used to predict future food aid instead
of previous food aid. We also run the Arellano-Bond model that regressed cereal production at
t on food aid at t+1 and t+2. We use the instrument at t+1 and t+2 for the food aid variable
at t+1 and t+2, and the results are shown in Column 7 and 8. Again, we obtain insignificant
coefficients of future food aid. The results support the validity of the instrument.
Heterogeneous Effects
We move on to study how the effects of food aid vary depending on a particular country’s
specific characteristics, and the results have implications for policy-makers. We divide the
countries into groups based on time frame, regions, income levels, and the average frequency of
receiving U.S. food aid, and then examine the heterogeneous effects of food aid on production.
We use the Arellano-Bond method and the results are shown in Table 15. In all categories,
production in the previous year was positively related to production during the current year.
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In addition, for each group of characteristics, we generate a dummy variable, and interact the
endogenous variable food aid with the dummy variable in order to represent the amount of
aid received by this group. We interact the instrumental variable with the dummy variable to
instrument for the new endogenous variable. An alternative method is to run the regression
separately for each group. Using this approach may result in the loss of observations, although
it allows for variations in the effects of other explanatory variables on the outcome across the
groups. To maintain the sample size, we report the results of regressions that include dummy
variables.1
The estimates in the first column of Table 15 reveal the effects of food aid on
production prior to 1990. 1990 was a watershed year for the U.S. food aid program because
the promotion of food security has been an explicit objective of food aid since 1990. Title II
emergency food aid has been predominant since then, whereas the volume of Title I food aid
decreased dramatically. The estimate of food aid before 1990 is -0.019 and is statistically
significant. In conjunction with the point estimate of food aid (-0.015) during the whole
sample period in Column 4 of Table 13, it can be inferred that the negative effect of food aid
on production occurred during the years prior to 1990, when Title I food aid outweighed Title
II food aid. The results make sense and can be supported by our identification strategy since
the instruments, especially U.S. wheat stocks and U.S. military aid, were significantly related
to food aid allocation before 1990. Others may argue that the relative proportions of Title I
and Title II aid started to change during the mid-1980s. Column 2 shows the effects of food
aid on production before 1985. The estimate in Column 2 is very similar to the estimate of the
effects on production prior to 1990.
The estimates of Column 3 demonstrate the heterogeneous effects of food aid on
production across regions. The regression also includes regional dummy variables. The results
show that food aid exerts significantly negative effects on production in Sub-Saharan Africa.
When we divide countries into three groups based on their income levels, estimates in Column
4 show that disincentive effects of aid exist for low-income countries. The results are
1We also use the second approach to study heterogeneous effects. Fortunately, heterogeneous effects are robust
under both methods.
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consistent with the findings for regions because most SSA countries are in the low-income
category.
Finally, we check whether the effects of food aid on production differ between regular
and irregular food recipient countries. We assign the value one to a country in a particular
year if the country receives any amount of cereal aid. Based on the mean of the aid indicator
during the entire time period, a country is categorized as a regular recipient country if the
mean of the aid indicator is above the median (0.65). Otherwise, the country is an irregular
recipient country. Column 5 shows that food aid has a disincentive effect on production in
regular recipient countries. The point estimate is -0.017, meaning that a 100% increase in
U.S. cereal food aid could lead to a 1.7% reduction in cereal production in regular recipient
countries compared with irregular recipient countries. The results are in accordance with our
expectations since regular recipient countries receive food aid more frequently, and are more
likely to experience the effects of food aid if there are any. For irregular recipient countries,
untimely and uncertain food aid flows may not be sufficient to persuade farmers to change
production behavior.
Robustness and Other Tests
This section evaluates some other possible scenarios that might confound the
interpretation of the results. We also exclude "outliers", and check the robustness of the results
for different sets of countries.
The previous results lead to the conclusion that U.S. cereal aid had led to reductions in
production in recipient countries. However, if the U.S. cereal aid crowds out cereal aid from
other donors, the negative effects on cereal production could be a result of the reduction in non-
U.S. cereal aid. The presence of the crowd-out has different implications for policy makers
than the situation without crowd out, and this may undermine the external validity of this study.
In order to determine whether the provision of U.S. cereal aid reduces the amount of cereal aid
from non-U.S. donors, we regress cereal aid from non-U.S. donors on U.S. cereal aid. The first
column of Table 16 displays the 2SLS estimates. The significantly positive coefficient of U.S.
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cereal aid suggests that we could not find sufficient evidence to support the crowding-out effects
of U.S. cereal aid on cereal aid from other donors. On the contrary, the point estimate of 0.4
indicates that other donors are likely to increase cereal aid donations when the U.S. provides
more aid.
In addition, it is possible that cereal food aid may drive farmers away from cereal
production due to distortions in the market. Instead of producing cereals, farmers may
produce additional grain substitutes. This test aims to provide more policy implications.
Columns 2-7 of Table 16 display the effects of U.S. cereal aid on production of animal
products, fruits, vegetables, oilseeds, tobacco, and cotton respectively. The model used is the
Arellano-Bond estimation. The estimate of cereal aid is insignificant, whereas the lagged
dependent variable is significant in all regressions. We can not find any evidence that farmers
change cereal production to other types of production in response to the provision of cereal
aid. We also expect to observe insignificant results due to the small amount of cereal aid
compared to the production level. Even if some farmers were to increase their production of
other commodities, such an increase would be too negligible to exert any significant effects on
production. 2
Table 17 reports the Arellano-Bond estimates, while excluding Russia and South
Vietnam, respectively. Russia and South Vietnam can be categorized as outliers. Russia
received huge amounts of cereal aid right after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As regards
South Vietnam, that country received large amounts of U.S. military aid but was not allied
with the U.S. The estimates show that excluding these two countries generates very similar
results as using the model that includes the full observations (Column 4 of Table 13). These
tests ensure that our results are not sensitive to outliers.
Column 3, 4 and 5 of Table 17 show the results of the first-stage, 2SLS, and Arellano-
Bond regressions that use the interaction term of the variable wheat stocks and alignment at t-1
as the instrument for the endogenous variable food aid in the following year. We conducted this
test to provide evidence for the validity of the instrument to those who are still concerned about
2We also use the instrumental variable method in the fixed effect model with and without controlling for the
one-year lagged dependent variable. All of the regressions generated insignificant results.
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the excludability of the variable dollar amount of U.S. military aid in logarithm. It may be
argued that military aid is likely to affect domestic production through its influence on conflict
in addition to the food aid channel although we control for the one-year lagged conflict in
the regression and provide an argument of irrelevance between military aid and outbreaks of
conflict. Here we show that the disincentive effect of food aid on production exists regardless
of whether we include military aid in the instrument or not.
Excluding the military aid component in the instrument, the first stage estimate in
Column 3 is still significant at the 1% level although the first stage Keibergen-Paap F-Statistic
is reduced to 7.4. This new instrument is weak, and the new 2SLS estimate is expected to be
larger than the estimate using a strong instrument. Column 4 shows that the new 2SLS
estimate is -0.74, which is larger in terms of the magnitude than the estimate using the
three-way interaction instrument. This 2SLS estimate is significant at the 10% level. This
indicates that U.S. military aid has a large power in explaining variations in U.S. food aid
shipments, but the disincentive effects on production do not mainly come from the effects of
military aid. Thus, the channels through which military aid affects domestic production are
not that crucial.
Mechanism
We now study the mechanism of the disincentive effect of food aid on production, that is
to explore through which channels that food aid could decrease production. The first hypothesis
is the price effect. As discussed in the theoretical framework, an inflow of food aid, regardless
of its Title, is very likely to reduce domestic price, thereby decreasing production. We test this
hypothesis by regressing the log form of the dollar amount of wheat producer prices on the
variable cereal aid in the instrumental variable model with the time and country fixed effects.
The first column of Table 18 shows the insignificant impact of cereal aid on wheat price. 3 The
number of observations in the regression is only 1,903, which accounts for roughly half of the
3We do not find the significant effects of food aid on price when we restrict the recipient countries to wheat-
growing countries, either.
67
total number of observations. The loss of observations is due to the limited availability of price
data. When we examine the impact of cereal aid on wheat price for low income countries before
1990, Column 2 of Table 18 shows a negative coefficient of -0.017 and significant at the 10%
level. This indicates that food aid might reduce wheat producer price for low-income countries
prior to 1990. However, the limited number of observations requires additional caution when
interpreting the results. In addition, we examine other groups in which the disincentive effects
on production are observable, and the estimates still show insignificant results.
Several reasons contribute to the insignificance of the price effect. Firstly, producer price
data are of poor quality. The FAO collects farm-gate prices (producer prices) by sending out
annual questionnaires to local farmers. The isolation of some developing countries from the
outside world, either due to poor road infrastructure or intra-conflict, may prevent researchers
to collect data. In addition, countries’ response rate is low, especially for African countries. The
FAO’s report shows that the average response rate for Africa during 2002-2007 was 29% (FAO,
2007). In addition to the incompleteness of data, developing countries sometimes provide
prices in non-standard quantities or provide no information on conversion factors to the metric
system (FAO, 2007). This compromises the quality of producer price data to a large extent.
Thus, the inability to find any significant effects on price using our data does not necessarily
imply the nonexistence of changes in price. Furthermore, governments in some developing
countries implemented price stabilization policies in response to the arrival of food aid in the
local market. Bezuneh, Deaton, and Zuhair (2003) found that stabilization of prices alleviated
price fluctuations caused by food aid, and reduced the adverse impacts of food aid on the local
market in Tunisia. In other places, the government established a series of policies to support
local farmers, such as establishing a price floor for crops or distributing subsidies to farmers.
With the implementation of price stabilization or price support policies, local producer prices
cannot accurately reflect the market conditions in recipient countries, and thus it would be
problematic to use FAO producer prices to study the price effect.
In addition to the price channel, food aid may decrease food production through its
impact on government actions. The availability of food aid may give policy makers excuses to
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postpone reforms in agriculture. Food aid simply disguises recipient countries’ own
shortcomings in food provision. Instead of investing in the agricultural sector, governments
invest in other areas, such as urbanization. In Africa, the rate of urbanization increased from
15% in 1960 to 40% in 2010, making urbanization the main policy narrative (Habitat, 2010).
In Nigeria, Rakodi (1997) estimated that 80% of investments spent on urban-area development
instead of agricultural development. If food aid resulted in a hesitation in essential agricultural
reforms or a shift in the investment priority away from agriculture, production would be
expected to decrease.
Discussion
We find that U.S. cereal food aid in the preceding year decreases local cereal production
in the following year using the instrumental variable method. The effects are primarily from
wheat and feed grain food aid. This finding confirms the disincentive effects of food aid on
production, which have been extensively discussed in theoretical papers but little evidence has
been shown in empirical studies. This negative relationship still holds when we control for the
one-year lagged dependent variable in the Arellano-Bond model, which is considered as the
optimal specification that addresses the Nickell bias.
As regards the magnitude of the effects, the coefficient of -0.015 in the AB model
indicates that if the U.S. doubled food aid shipments, production in the recipient countries
would decrease by 1.5% on average. This magnitude is similar to the effect found in the
previous studies (Gelan, 2007; Seevers, 1968). Seevers (1968) used supply and demand
elasticities along with plausible values for other variables in India to estimate the magnitude of
the disincentive effect. He found that an about 100% increase in food aid would cause 7.9%
drop in local food prices, and thus lead to a 2% decrease in domestic production. However,
Seevers’ study is old and covered the period of 1956-57 and 1961-62. Gelan (2007) studied
the percentage increase in production in Ethiopia with a removal of food aid. Using the
computable general equilibrium model, Gelan concluded with a 2.2% increase in production
in absence of in-kind food aid. Compared to the magnitude in Gelan’s paper, the coefficient in
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our study is smaller. This is expected because we study the average effect in developing
countries while Gelan only studied Ethiopia, which relies heavily on food aid. In spite of this
small difference in the magnitude, our study supports the disincentive effects of food aid, and
this finding is not subject to a particular method.
In addition, we find that the magnitude of the disincentive effects is reduced when we
change the measurement unit of production and food aid to calories from metric tons. A
decrease in the magnitude of the coefficient indicates that recipient countries, which receive
aid in the form of high-calorie grains from the U.S., tend to reduce the production of grains
that contain fewer calories relative to wheat, which is the primary type of U.S. cereal aid.
From this perspective, U.S. cereal aid discourages cereal production to a lesser extent.
The results also show that the disincentive effects are significant for Sub-Saharan African
and low-income countries. In contrast to our findings, Abdulai, Barrett, and Hoddinott (2005)
showed that food aid did not depress food production in rural Sub-Saharan African countries.
Abdulai (2000) used the WFP food aid data in a vector autoregression model and studied the
dynamic relationships between production and food aid during 1970-2000. The differentiated
findings may be a result of different data, methods, and time periods between Abdulai’s paper
and our study.
The contradicting findings also highlight the different effects of various types of food
aid on the outcome. The WFP food aid data used in Abdulai’s paper was mainly comprised of
U.S. Title II emergency food aid while this paper used aggregated food aid data. When we also
focus on the time period when Title II food aid dominated in our data, the results show that the
effect of food aid on production is insignificant, which is consistent with Abdulai’s findings.
This confirms the importance of knowing which types of food aid are prominent in the studied
period because different titles of food aid could have different impacts on the outcomes.
As to whether or not food aid depresses production also depends on the frequency of
a country receiving food aid. We find that the disincentive effects of food aid on production
are significant for regular recipient countries but insignificant for irregular recipient countries.
The results are in line with previous literature (Tadesse and Shively, 2009) that found that the
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lack of certainty in the amount and delivery time of food aid makes any changes in production
unwise. Lowder (2004) also considered the uncertainty of food aid shipments as one of the
explanations for insignificant impacts of aid on production found in his paper.
Finally, we exclude other channels that may confound our interpretation of the negative
coefficient of food aid. First, we do not find evidence that U.S. cereal food aid crowds out
cereal aid from other donors, and thus we eliminate the probability that the negative effects on
cereal production are caused by the reduction in non-U.S. cereal aid. Furthermore, no
evidence can be found that farmers are driven away from cereal production to animal or
vegetable production due to the distortion in the grain market. When we examine if food aid
reduces production through its impact on price, we fail to get conclusive results because of
poor quality of food producer price data. Although food aid reduced wheat producer prices for
low-income countries prior to 1990, the limited number of observations requires extra caution
when interpreting the results.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
U.S. food aid is an important tool to alleviate hunger and promote food security.
However, many researchers have expressed concerns over the disincentive effects of food aid
on production. Many studies empirically tested whether food aid depresses local agricultural
production using market-level data, but their results vary widely depending on the
characteristics of the country as well as the time period in their studies. In spite of the rigorous
design of the models, these micro-level studies lack external validity, and the results are
strictly restricted to a given setting, including geographic location, cultural context, and
demographic characteristics. Undoubtedly this casts a shadow on their power to address
policy questions. Our study, instead, uses country-level data and provides policy makers
causal evidence of the average effects of food aid on production in recipient countries.
This paper studies the impacts of food aid on production using a dataset with coverage
of 118 developing countries from 1961–2006. Before discussing the effects on production, we
also explore the patterns in food aid distribution to acquire a better insight about the driving
forces of the U.S. food aid programs. Food aid shipments are responsive to donor countries’
political interests as well as recipient countries’ needs. The U.S. is likely to give food aid to its
political allies and countries with military-strategic importance to the United States, especially
when the U.S. cereal stocks are sufficient. With regard to recipient countries, populous and
poor countries as well as those countries suffering from disasters and conflicts are likely to
receive more U.S. food aid. Importantly, the U.S. responds to production shortfalls in recipient
countries. This finding indicates a possibility of reverse causality between food aid flows and
domestic production, and thus justifies the use of the instrumental variable method to isolate
one effect from the other in the study of the impacts on production. Specifically, we use a three-
way interaction term of U.S. wheat stocks, U.S. military assistance, and a measurement of a
country’s alliance with the U.S. through its voting pattern in the U.N. to instrument for food
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aid receipts in the following year. The results show that U.S. cereal food aid depresses cereal
production in recipient countries. This negative relationship still holds when we include the
one-year lagged dependent variable and run the regression using the Arellano-Bond approach.
Food aid may decrease production through its influence on price or through the changes in
government actions. Due to the limitations of data, we do not have sufficient evidence to
support our hypotheses. Further micro-level research is necessary to identify channels through
which food aid affects production.
In general, our results may deliver a pessimistic attitude towards the U.S. food aid
program, but the heterogeneous effects of food aid convey more policy implications. The
disincentive effects of food aid on production are particularly significant for Sub-Saharan
African countries, low-income countries, and regular recipients of U.S. food aid. This
provides policy makers important information on groups of countries that are more likely to
experience the disincentive effects, and food aid allocation to these groups should be
thoroughly evaluated in order to minimize the adverse impacts.
Knowing the existence of disincentive effects in SSA countries has significant policy
implications. Sub-Saharan African countries experienced declined per capita food production
over the past fifty years in spite of receiving a large amount of foreign assistance. In this paper,
we provide empirical evidence that food aid depresses food production in Sub-Saharan African
countries. We are not saying food aid recipients are the only contributors that should be blamed
for the low production level in the SSA; nevertheless, many societal and historical reasons are
attributable to the slow agricultural development. For those who are struggling with sufficient
food provisions, such as many SSA countries, this negative impact on production caused by
food aid is likely to result in a higher dependence on food aid, which may lead to far-reaching
consequences in the long run. The findings of this paper could let policy-makers reconsider the
accountability of food aid on poverty in SSA. Yet, before any policy decision is made, we still
need to understand the key causes of poverty and evaluate the available assistance delivered to
SSA.
Another interesting finding that is significant for policy-makers is the change in the
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effects of food aid on production along with the change in the composition of the food aid
programs. Before 1990, Title I food aid dominated and the disincentive effect was significant.
In contrast, the disincentive effect disappeared after 1990 when Title II emergency food aid
dominated. Title I food aid, on average, has an adverse impact on local production while Title
II food aid does not. This result corresponds to the theoretical framework that program food
aid may cause an excessive supply in the market, which is likely to result in a reduction in
price. Although Title I food aid is no longer used, the nonemergency assistance under Title II
is similar to Title I in that NGOs sell food aid in the market to use the proceeds for projects.
The findings of this paper suggest that policy-makers as well as NGOs be aware of different
effects of food aid under different titles and, if it is possible, mainly use food aid for
humanitarian needs.
Finally, we discuss potential directions for future studies. This study uses macro-level
data. It would be interesting to focus on top destinations of food aid shipments and examine
the effects at the household level as well. To get a valid policy inference, researchers should
analyze the evidence from different perspectives, either at the micro- or macro-levels, and then
combine the results from empirical studies with reasoned intuition. Admittedly, the effect of
food aid on production is only one aspect of the impacts of food aid. To gain a comprehensive
understanding of the efficiency and effectiveness of the U.S. food aid program, findings on other
perspectives, such as the impacts on food security, economic growth, and commercial trade are
all necessary. Lastly, it would be important to study if the impacts of in-kind food aid on food
production are different from the impacts of cash transfer assistance. The Administration and
Congress recognize the need for food aid reforms to replace in-kind food aid with cash transfers
and local purchases. Due to the disincentive effects of in-kind food aid, in-kind food aid may
not be the best tool to assist development; however, this does not necessarily mean that cash
transfers and local purchases do not have any adverse impacts. Therefore, thorough comparison
studies between in-kind food aid and other types of assistance should be conducted to gather
more evidence to either support or oppose the reforms.
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Table 3: A List of Countries
East Asia & Pacific Europe & Central Asia
Latin America & 
Caribbean
Middle East & North 
Africa South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa
Cambodia Albania Argentina Algeria Afghanistan Angola
China Armenia (92-06) Bolivia Egypt Bangladesh Benin
Indonesia Azerbaijan (92-06) Brazil Iran India Burkina Faso
Laos Belarus (92-06) Chile Iraq Nepal Burundi
Malaysia Bosnia Herzegovina (92-06) Colombia Lebanon Pakistan Cameroon
Myanmar Bulgaria Cuba Libya Sri Lanka African Republic
North Korea Croatia (92-06) Dominican Republic Morocco Chad
Papua New Guinea Czech Republic (93-06) Ecuador North Yemen (61-89) Cote D'Ivoire
Philippines Czechoslovakia (61-92) El Salvador Syria DR Congo
South Korea Estonia (92-06) Guatemala Tunisia Eritrea (93-06)
South Vietnam (61-75) Georgia (92-06) Haiti Yemen (90-06) Ethiopia (93-06)
Thailand Greece Honduras Ethiopia PDR (61-92)
Vietnam (76-06) Hungary Jamaica Ghana
Kazakhstan (92-06) Mexico Guinea
Kyrgyzstan (92-06) Nicaragua Kenya
Latvia (92-06) Paraguay Madagascar
Lithuania (92-06) Peru Malawi
Macedonia (92-06) Puerto Rica Mali
Moldova (92-06) Uruguay Mauritania
Montenegro (06) Venezuela Mozambique
Poland Niger
Portugal Nigeria
Romania Rwanda
Russia (92-06) Senegal
Serbia (06) Sierra Leone
Serbia Montenegro (03-05) Somalia
Slovakia (93-06) South Africa
Slovenia (92-06) Sudan
Tajikistan (92-06) Tanzania
Turkey Togo
Turkmenistan (92-06) Uganda
Ukraine (92-06) Zambia
Ussr (61-91) Zimbabwe
Uzbekistan (92-06)
Yugoslavia (61-92)
A List of Countries By Regions
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Table 4: Summary Statistics
count mean sd min max
recipient countries 4429 58.47 33.86 1 118
year coded 4429 1984.52 13.45 1961 2006
US cereal aid 4429 70832.15 321225.85 0 8489998
US cereal aid per capita 4429 0.00 0.01 0 0
US cereal aid(kcal) 4429 2.34e+08 1.07e+09 0 2.82e+10
US cereal aid(cal)per capita 4429 12.60 33.02 0 442
Cereal Production 4429 11596800.27 39866320.84 428 458395648
Cereal Production per capita 4429 0.24 0.23 0 2
Cereal Production (cal) 4429 3.60e+10 1.29e+11 1523680 1.53e+12
Cereal Production (cal)per capita 4429 737.74 749.84 0 5728
Deviation of rain 4307 -0.07 175.09 -1143 1545
Population 4429 40078.79 132243.52 692 1313974
Disasters 4429 1.43 2.85 0 37
Conflict 4429 0.25 0.43 0 1
Openness score 4065 60.27 38.84 1 623
Real GDP per capita 4065 4511.86 4771.24 306 56312
Democracy score 4209 2.72 3.58 0 10
Arable land (%total) 4429 0.16 0.14 0 1
Military Aid per capita 4429 2.86 16.38 0 403
log(U.S. Military Aid) 4429 7.31 7.81 0 23
US economic aid per capita 4429 5.47 14.99 0 327
Cereal imports per capita 4429 0.05 0.06 0 1
Net cereal imports per capita 4263 0.05 0.06 0 1
Net cereal imports per capita(cal) 4240 148.64 213.54 0 1879
Align 4149 0.24 0.15 0 1
FAO wheat producer price 2181 1.40e+09 1.61e+10 0 2.59e+11
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Table 5: Summary Statistics by Regions
Region stats Disasters Conflict Openness GDP per capita Democracy
East Asia & Pacific mean 2.931 0.429 63.322 3687.528 2.548
min 0.000 0.000 4.263 429.591 0.000
max 37.000 1.000 215.684 22972.610 10.000
Europe & Central 
Asia mean 0.996 0.090 68.896 8174.263 4.296
min 0.000 0.000 2.260 1340.077 0.000
max 25.000 1.000 293.946 26690.800 10.000
Latin America & 
Caribbean mean 1.463 0.155 52.717 6477.003 4.464
min 0.000 0.000 7.335 1452.979 0.000
max 11.000 1.000 174.326 26940.020 10.000
Middle East & 
North Africa mean 0.757 0.311 85.678 6904.548 0.353
min 0.000 0.000 30.599 737.594 0.000
max 9.000 1.000 353.707 56311.590 8.000
South Asia mean 3.851 0.529 40.019 1762.324 3.988
min 0.000 0.000 9.876 306.318 0.000
max 31.000 1.000 152.001 5786.568 9.000
Sub-Saharan Africa mean 0.828 0.258 56.862 1682.764 1.400
min 0.000 0.000 1.086 312.406 0.000
max 12.000 1.000 622.626 9978.645 9.000
Total mean 1.433 0.251 60.269 4511.859 2.720
min 0.000 0.000 1.086 306.318 0.000
max 37.000 1.000 622.626 56311.590 10.000
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Table 6: Structure of Cereal Aid Data
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Table 7: Determinants of Food Aid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Tobit Tobit_M Tobit_MC Tobit_MC_M
coeff coeff marginal coeff marginal
log(US cereal prod)t 0.29 0.36 0.18 0.37 0.18
(0.575) (0.792) (0.381) (0.791) (0.381)
log(US cereal prod)t-1 0.91∗ 1.45∗ 0.70∗ 1.47∗ 0.71∗
(0.508) (0.792) (0.382) (0.791) (0.382)
Democracy score 0.022 0.0034 0.0016 0.030 0.015
(0.0571) (0.0470) (0.0226) (0.0486) (0.0234)
Alignment 1.97∗∗ 3.46∗∗∗ 1.66∗∗∗ 3.60∗∗∗ 1.73∗∗∗
(0.909) (0.885) (0.429) (0.893) (0.435)
Conflict -0.43 -0.54∗ -0.26∗ -0.52∗ -0.25∗
(0.364) (0.305) (0.147) (0.304) (0.147)
Log(population) 3.19∗∗ 2.58∗∗∗ 1.24∗∗∗ 7.43∗∗∗ 3.58∗∗∗
(1.584) (0.574) (0.280) (1.264) (0.621)
Log(GDP per capita) -2.59∗∗∗ -4.58∗∗∗ -2.20∗∗∗ -4.37∗∗∗ -2.11∗∗∗
(0.653) (0.365) (0.193) (0.448) (0.230)
log(Cereal Production)t -0.77∗ -0.85∗∗ -0.41∗∗ -1.12∗∗∗ -0.54∗∗∗
(0.412) (0.349) (0.169) (0.404) (0.196)
log(Cereal Production)t-1 -0.41∗∗ -0.76∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗ -0.69∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗
(0.184) (0.204) (0.0987) (0.203) (0.0985)
Disasters 0.12∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.0485) (0.0561) (0.0272) (0.0570) (0.0277)
Log(US military aid) 0.073∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.0180) (0.0159) (0.00806) (0.0161) (0.00803)
Observations 3700 3700 3700 3700 3700
Standard errors in parentheses
Notes: An observation is a country and a year. The sample includes 118 recipient countries from 1961-2006.
All regressions include country fixed effects and time trends.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 8: Determinants of Food Aid (Before and After 1990 and 1985)
(1) (2) (3)
Tobit Before-1990 After-1990
log(US cereal prod)t 0.18 1.11∗∗ -0.58
(0.381) (0.474) (0.833)
log(US cereal prod)t-1 0.71∗ 1.98∗∗∗ -0.39
(0.382) (0.473) (0.847)
Democracy score 0.015 -0.040 0.026
(0.0234) (0.0348) (0.0406)
Conflict -0.25∗ -0.075 0.0013
(0.147) (0.207) (0.222)
Alignment 1.73∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗ 2.82∗∗
(0.435) (0.532) (1.123)
Log(population) 3.58∗∗∗ 2.16∗∗ 9.00∗∗∗
(0.621) (1.096) (1.310)
Log(GDP per capita) -2.11∗∗∗ -2.85∗∗∗ -1.14∗∗
(0.230) (0.385) (0.474)
log(Cereal Production)t -0.54∗∗∗ 0.077 -0.33
(0.196) (0.336) (0.278)
log(Cereal Production)t-1 -0.33∗∗∗ -1.51∗∗∗ -0.13
(0.0985) (0.340) (0.0868)
Disasters 0.078∗∗∗ 0.028 0.12∗∗
(0.0277) (0.0512) (0.0558)
Log(US military aid) 0.056∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ -0.0065
(0.00803) (0.0129) (0.0146)
Observations 3700 2133 1567
Standard errors in parentheses
Notes: An observation is a country and a year. The sample includes 118 recipient countries from 1961-2006.
All regressions include country fixed effects and time trends.Coefficients are marginal effects
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 9: Determinants of Food Aid by Regions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EA_P Eu_CA LA_C ME SA SSA
log(US cereal prod)t -0.59 -2.10∗∗ -0.57 0.77 -0.51 2.72∗∗∗
(0.976) (0.995) (0.790) (1.192) (1.960) (0.761)
log(US cereal prod)t-1 -0.87 -0.27 0.73 -0.48 -1.73 2.82∗∗∗
(1.002) (0.985) (0.806) (1.152) (1.920) (0.750)
Democracy score 0.065 0.025 -0.027 0.26 -0.33∗∗∗ 0.030
(0.0643) (0.0564) (0.0465) (0.178) (0.122) (0.0532)
Alignment 0.78 2.47∗∗ 0.58 0.18 7.06∗∗ -0.69
(1.178) (1.040) (0.755) (1.568) (3.002) (0.982)
Log(population) -1.54 1.36 8.91∗∗∗ -6.20∗∗∗ 13.3∗∗ -2.30
(3.151) (1.834) (1.744) (2.053) (5.344) (1.635)
Log(GDP per capita) -2.07∗∗∗ -1.76∗∗ -3.87∗∗∗ -1.20∗ -0.94 2.11∗∗∗
(0.677) (0.787) (0.624) (0.637) (2.113) (0.488)
log(Cereal Production)t 1.43 -1.11∗∗ -0.43 -0.056 -1.50 -0.065
(0.903) (0.498) (0.682) (0.419) (2.698) (0.443)
log(Cereal Production)t-1 1.15 -0.23∗∗∗ -1.81∗∗∗ 0.16 -4.41∗ -1.92∗∗∗
(0.911) (0.0855) (0.696) (0.411) (2.645) (0.450)
Disasters 0.091∗∗ 0.075 0.021 -0.11 -0.067 0.13
(0.0395) (0.0779) (0.0751) (0.156) (0.0928) (0.0832)
Log(US military aid) 0.022 0.045∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.0055
(0.0266) (0.0219) (0.0177) (0.0242) (0.0427) (0.0156)
Observations 334 606 845 389 240 1286
Standard errors in parentheses
Notes: An observation is a country and a year. The sample includes 118 recipient countries from 1961-2006.
All regressions include country fixed effects and time trends.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 10: Determinants of Food Aid (Other Types)
(1) (2)
Animal Oilseeds
log(US animal prod aid) log(US oilseed aid)
log(US prod)t 9.55∗ 1.16
(5.328) (0.942)
log(US prod)t-1 9.83∗ 4.06∗∗∗
(5.193) (0.928)
Democracy score -0.034 0.14∗∗∗
(0.0581) (0.0462)
Alignment -3.82∗∗∗ 3.36∗∗∗
(0.999) (0.843)
Log(population) -3.50∗∗ 7.03∗∗∗
(1.499) (1.157)
Log(GDP per capita) -2.79∗∗∗ -3.96∗∗∗
(0.543) (0.423)
log(production)t -3.41∗ 0.55∗
(1.792) (0.928)
log(production)t-1 3.88∗∗ -0.90∗∗∗
(1.790) (0.336)
Disasters 0.26∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(0.0702) (0.0536)
Conflict -0.31 -0.32
(0.353) (0.284)
Log(US military aid) 0.12∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.0191) (0.0150)
Observations 3696 3695
Standard errors in parentheses
Notes: An observation is a country and a year. The sample includes 118 recipient countries from 1961-2006.
All regressions include country fixed effects and time trends.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 11: Effects of Food Aid on Production with wheat stocks× log(military aid)× alignment
as the Instrument
Table 1: E↵ects of food aid on production with wheat stocks*log(military aid)*align as the instrument
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS FStage RForm 2SLS Wheat Rice Feed Grains Calories
Log(cereal aid)t-1 -0.0100⇤⇤ -0.062⇤⇤⇤
(0.00453) (0.0169)
Log(population)t-1 0.97⇤⇤⇤ 1.54 0.98⇤⇤⇤ 1.08⇤⇤⇤ 1.19⇤⇤⇤ 0.020 1.15⇤⇤⇤ 1.09⇤⇤⇤
(0.227) (1.288) (0.225) (0.199) (0.243) (1.806) (0.265) (0.194)
Deviation precip 0.00017⇤⇤⇤ -0.00043 0.00016⇤⇤⇤ 0.00013⇤⇤⇤ 0.00018⇤⇤⇤ 0.00042 0.00011⇤⇤ 0.00014⇤⇤⇤
(0.0000465) (0.000291) (0.0000460) (0.0000444) (0.0000553) (0.000504) (0.0000451) (0.0000450)
Disasters t-2 0.0048 0.045 0.0019 0.0047 0.0019 0.026 0.0036 0.0043
(0.00423) (0.0465) (0.00478) (0.00543) (0.00573) (0.0629) (0.00620) (0.00554)
Conflict t-2 -0.051⇤ -0.026 -0.071⇤⇤ -0.073⇤⇤ -0.078⇤ -0.31 -0.050 -0.073⇤⇤
(0.0294) (0.300) (0.0300) (0.0343) (0.0403) (0.537) (0.0330) (0.0340)
Democracy score t-2 0.0089 0.057 0.0056 0.0091 0.014 -0.055 0.0081 0.0077
(0.00655) (0.0595) (0.00619) (0.00697) (0.00878) (0.114) (0.00772) (0.00695)
Log(US economic aid)t-2 -0.0013 0.21⇤⇤⇤ 0.0010 0.014⇤⇤⇤ 0.018⇤⇤⇤ -0.058 0.011⇤⇤ 0.012⇤⇤
(0.00231) (0.0233) (0.00217) (0.00470) (0.00653) (0.113) (0.00468) (0.00487)
Openness score t-2 -0.00035 0.0020 -0.00042 -0.00030 -0.00043 0.0026 0.00033 -0.00031
(0.000522) (0.00376) (0.000518) (0.000471) (0.000532) (0.00649) (0.000599) (0.000474)
Log(GDP per capita)t-2 0.16⇤⇤ -3.12⇤⇤⇤ 0.17⇤⇤⇤ -0.019 0.0047 0.86 0.023 0.0041
(0.0628) (0.623) (0.0650) (0.0822) (0.0853) (1.446) (0.0840) (0.0850)
Arable land t-2 0.77 18.3⇤⇤⇤ 0.59 1.72⇤⇤⇤ 1.30⇤ -6.47 1.47⇤⇤ 1.84⇤⇤⇤
(0.652) (5.775) (0.625) (0.637) (0.665) (14.82) (0.713) (0.653)
US W product*US Mil aid*align 0.0099⇤⇤⇤ -0.00061⇤⇤⇤
(0.00207) (0.000151)
log(wheat aid)t-1 -0.080⇤⇤⇤
(0.0245)
log(rice aid)t-1 0.76
(1.512)
log(feed grain aid)t-1 -0.077⇤⇤⇤
(0.0238)
Log(cereal aid) cal t-1 -0.032⇤⇤⇤
(0.0103)
Observations 3629 3531 3531 3531 3531 3531 3531 3531
Standard errors in parentheses
Notes: An observation is a country and a year. The sample includes 118 recipient countries from 1961-2006.
All regressions include country fixed e↵ects and year fixed e↵ects. Columns 4-8 contain the 2SLS estimators.
⇤ p < .10, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
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Table 12: Effects of Food Aid on Production with wheat stocks × log(military aid) as the
Instrument
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FStage RForm 2SLS Calories 2SLS RS
Instrument 0.0026∗∗∗ -0.00015∗∗
(0.000717) (0.0000589)
Log(population)t-1 1.39 0.98∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗
(1.323) (0.227) (0.199) (0.192) (0.200)
Deviation precip -0.00051∗ 0.00017∗∗∗ 0.00014∗∗∗ 0.00014∗∗∗ 0.00013∗∗∗
(0.000293) (0.0000475) (0.0000456) (0.0000470) (0.0000440)
Disasters t-2 0.013 0.0038 0.0046 0.0042 0.0047
(0.0498) (0.00413) (0.00506) (0.00523) (0.00549)
Conflict t-2 -0.029 -0.052∗ -0.053 -0.054 -0.073∗∗
(0.281) (0.0296) (0.0329) (0.0334) (0.0348)
Openness score t-2 0.00076 -0.00041 -0.00036 -0.00038 -0.00030
(0.00381) (0.000528) (0.000477) (0.000479) (0.000472)
Log(GDP per capita)t-2 -3.25∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.0046 0.0091 -0.023
(0.613) (0.0622) (0.0988) (0.110) (0.102)
Arable land t-2 18.7∗∗∗ 0.67 1.71∗∗ 1.93∗∗ 1.74∗∗
(5.794) (0.651) (0.761) (0.853) (0.764)
Log(US economic aid)t-2 0.21∗∗∗ -0.00078 0.011 0.010 0.014∗∗
(0.0237) (0.00243) (0.00683) (0.00798) (0.00696)
Democracy score t-2 0.030 0.0091 0.011 0.0094 0.0092
(0.0557) (0.00654) (0.00680) (0.00681) (0.00709)
Log(cereal aid)t-1 -0.056∗∗ -0.060∗∗
(0.0258) (0.0269)
Log(cereal aid)_cal_t-1 -0.032∗
(0.0178)
Observations 3629 3629 3629 3629 3531
Standard errors in parentheses
Notes: An observation is a country and a year. The sample includes 118 recipient countries from 1961-2006.
All regressions include country fixed effects and year fixed effects. Columns 3-5 contain the 2SLS estimators.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 13: Effects of Food Aid on Production with a One-Year Lagged Dependent Variable
Table 1: Effects of food aid on production with one-year lagged dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FStage RForm 2SLS A-B A-B Cal
US W product*US Mil aid*align 0.0092∗∗∗ -0.00021∗∗∗
(0.00204) (0.0000783)
L.log(Cereal Production) -1.10∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗
(0.419) (0.0556) (0.0577) (0.0649)
Log(population)t-1 2.61∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.49∗∗
(1.235) (0.105) (0.0994) (0.211) (0.213)
Deviation precip -0.00038 0.00014∗∗∗ 0.00013∗∗∗ 0.00016∗∗∗ 0.00016∗∗∗
(0.000279) (0.0000285) (0.0000278) (0.0000247) (0.0000248)
Disasters t-2 0.049 -0.00029 0.00084 0.00093 0.00086
(0.0461) (0.00223) (0.00259) (0.00299) (0.00302)
Conflict t-2 -0.085 -0.040∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗ -0.0032 -0.0015
(0.304) (0.0148) (0.0165) (0.0172) (0.0174)
Openness score t-2 0.0014 -0.00012 -0.000092 0.00014 0.00012
(0.00356) (0.000248) (0.000247) (0.000366) (0.000370)
Log(GDP per capita)t-2 -2.91∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗ -0.0039 0.049 0.055
(0.613) (0.0306) (0.0398) (0.0654) (0.0636)
Arable land t-2 19.0∗∗∗ 0.21 0.66∗ -0.055 -0.086
(5.547) (0.280) (0.339) (0.559) (0.566)
Log(US economic aid)t-2 0.21∗∗∗ 0.00060 0.0054∗∗ -0.000083 -0.00041
(0.0232) (0.00107) (0.00244) (0.00159) (0.00160)
Democracy score t-2 0.063 0.0024 0.0039 -0.0079∗∗ -0.0078∗∗
(0.0590) (0.00271) (0.00313) (0.00383) (0.00387)
Log(cereal aid)t-1 -0.023∗∗ -0.015∗
(0.00913) (0.00805)
L.log(Cereal Production) cal 0.16∗∗
(0.0631)
Log(cereal aid) cal t-1 -0.0069∗
(0.00404)
Observations 3531 3531 3531 3406 3406
Standard errors in parentheses
Notes: An observation is a country and a year. The sample includes 118 recipient countries from 1961-2006.
All regressions include country fixed effects and year fixed effects. Column 3 reports 2SLS estimators, and 4-8 contain the Arellano-Bond estimators.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 14: Validity of the Instrument
Table 1: Validity of the Instrument
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LWS OneY LWS TwoY LWS ThreeY LFGS TwoY Inst t Inst t+1 FA t+1 FA t+2
US W product t-1
US Mil aid t-2*align t-2 0.0092⇤⇤⇤
(0.00219)
L.log(Cereal Production) -1.11⇤⇤⇤ -1.10⇤⇤⇤ -1.13⇤⇤⇤ -1.18⇤⇤⇤ -1.76⇤⇤ -1.87⇤⇤ 0.15⇤⇤ 0.16⇤⇤
(0.419) (0.419) (0.414) (0.426) (0.765) (0.802) (0.0659) (0.0702)
Log(population)t-1 2.64⇤⇤ 2.61⇤⇤ 2.73⇤⇤ 2.67⇤⇤ 0.54 -0.23 0.32 0.13
(1.236) (1.235) (1.176) (1.270) (3.443) (3.508) (0.211) (0.228)
Deviation precip -0.00036 -0.00038 -0.00032 -0.00040 -0.00015 -0.00013 0.00016⇤⇤⇤ 0.00016⇤⇤⇤
(0.000279) (0.000279) (0.000277) (0.000283) (0.000412) (0.000416) (0.0000247) (0.0000257)
Disasters t-2 0.048 0.049 0.052 0.031 0.048 0.075 0.00070 0.0031
(0.0462) (0.0461) (0.0447) (0.0466) (0.0859) (0.0897) (0.00309) (0.00321)
Conflict t-2 -0.093 -0.085 -0.094 -0.037 -0.55⇤ -0.58⇤ 0.0057 -0.0041
(0.306) (0.304) (0.306) (0.318) (0.312) (0.317) (0.0171) (0.0176)
Openness score t-2 0.0012 0.0014 0.0020 0.00089 -0.0057⇤ -0.0060⇤ -0.000060 0.000022
(0.00360) (0.00356) (0.00371) (0.00359) (0.00332) (0.00335) (0.000370) (0.000376)
Log(GDP per capita)t-2 -2.92⇤⇤⇤ -2.91⇤⇤⇤ -2.82⇤⇤⇤ -2.89⇤⇤⇤ -5.87⇤⇤⇤ -6.22⇤⇤⇤ 0.097 0.12⇤
(0.614) (0.613) (0.585) (0.627) (1.012) (1.027) (0.0608) (0.0646)
Arable land t-2 18.9⇤⇤⇤ 19.0⇤⇤⇤ 18.4⇤⇤⇤ 18.8⇤⇤⇤ 43.9⇤⇤⇤ 44.7⇤⇤⇤ -0.090 -0.21
(5.554) (5.547) (5.344) (5.551) (8.481) (8.849) (0.565) (0.591)
Log(US economic aid)t-2 0.21⇤⇤⇤ 0.21⇤⇤⇤ 0.21⇤⇤⇤ 0.22⇤⇤⇤ 0.30⇤⇤⇤ 0.30⇤⇤⇤ -0.0013 -0.00091
(0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0228) (0.0238) (0.0316) (0.0329) (0.00152) (0.00157)
Democracy score t-2 0.061 0.063 0.062 0.053 0.061 0.076 -0.0080⇤⇤ -0.0073⇤
(0.0592) (0.0590) (0.0570) (0.0610) (0.0996) (0.102) (0.00381) (0.00388)
US W product t-2
US Mil aid t-2*align t-2 0.0092⇤⇤⇤
(0.00204)
US W product t-3
US Mil aid t-2*align t-2 0.0086⇤⇤⇤
(0.00196)
US FGrains product t-2
US Mil aid t-2*align t-2 0.018⇤⇤⇤
(0.00516)
US W product t
US Mil aid t*align t 0.0055
(0.00500)
US W product t+1
US Mil aid t+1*align t+1 0.0030
(0.00494)
Log(cereal aid)t+1 -0.013
(0.00802)
Log(cereal aid)t+2 -0.012
(0.00963)
Observations 3531 3531 3470 3454 3333 3232 3308 3208
Standard errors in parentheses
Notes: An observation is a country and a year. The sample includes 118 recipient countries from 1961-2006.
All regressions include country fixed e↵ects and year fixed e↵ects. Columns 1-6 are first-stage results. Columns 7-8 contain the Arellano-Bond estimators.
⇤ p < .10, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
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Table 15: Heterogeneous Effects
Table 1: Heterogeneous Effects of Food aid on Production
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
90 85 Region Income Propensity of receiving aid
log(aid)t-1 year90D -0.019∗∗
(0.00792)
L.ln CerealsProduct 1 0.12∗ 0.11∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.13∗ 0.15∗∗
(0.0633) (0.0632) (0.0672) (0.0677) (0.0655)
Log(population)t-1 0.48∗∗ 0.47∗∗ 0.47∗∗ 0.48∗∗ 0.44∗∗
(0.208) (0.207) (0.222) (0.211) (0.211)
Deviation precip 0.00016∗∗∗ 0.00016∗∗∗ 0.00017∗∗∗ 0.00016∗∗∗ 0.00016∗∗∗
(0.0000243) (0.0000242) (0.0000255) (0.0000251) (0.0000247)
Disasters t-2 0.0012 0.0012 0.000052 0.00054 0.0014
(0.00294) (0.00293) (0.00314) (0.00302) (0.00300)
Conflict t-2 -0.0038 -0.0019 -0.0086 -0.0014 -0.0022
(0.0169) (0.0167) (0.0191) (0.0174) (0.0172)
Openness score t-2 0.00012 0.000090 0.00014 0.00020 0.00015
(0.000359) (0.000358) (0.000389) (0.000372) (0.000366)
Log(GDP per capita)t-2 0.047 0.056 0.049 0.057 0.075
(0.0632) (0.0618) (0.0716) (0.0662) (0.0620)
Democracy score t-2 -0.0070∗ -0.0068∗ -0.0077∗ -0.0080∗∗ -0.0076∗∗
(0.00377) (0.00377) (0.00405) (0.00383) (0.00382)
Arable land t-2 -0.11 0.014 -0.18 -0.11 -0.11
(0.550) (0.548) (0.598) (0.562) (0.560)
Log(US economic aid)t-2 0.00025 -0.00021 -0.00054 -0.00045 -0.00037
(0.00157) (0.00152) (0.00174) (0.00167) (0.00156)
log(aid)t-1 year85D -0.019∗∗
(0.00791)
log(cereal aid)t-1 EAP -0.0029
(0.0276)
log(cereal aid)t-1 ECA 0.0071
(0.0272)
log(cereal aid)t-1 LAC -0.0074
(0.0218)
log(cereal aid)t-1 MENA -0.014
(0.0234)
log(cereal aid)t-1 SA -0.039
(0.0261)
log(cereal aid)t-1 SSA -0.025∗
(0.0129)
log(cereal aid) low -0.021∗
(0.0126)
log(cereal aid) lowMid -0.012
(0.0125)
log(cereal aid) UpperMid 0.0036
(0.0246)
log(cereal aid)t-1 regularRD -0.017∗
(0.0101)
Observations 3406 3406 3406 3406 3406
Standard errors in parentheses
Notes: An observation is a country and a year. The sample includes 118 recipient countries from 1961-2006.
All regressions include country fixed effects and year fixed effects.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 16: Robustness Tests
Table 1: Robustness tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Non-US CerealA Animals Fruits Vegetable Oilseeds Tobacco Cotton
Log(cereal aid)t-1 0.40∗∗ -0.0028 -0.0026 -0.00071 -0.018 0.0077 -0.0090
(0.16) (0.0024) (0.0072) (0.0043) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015)
Log(population)t-1 1.52 0.010 0.18 0.070 -0.26 0.51 0.64
(1.35) (0.094) (0.15) (0.17) (0.25) (0.41) (0.40)
Deviation precip -0.00022 0.0000080 0.000012 0.000044∗∗∗ 0.000049 -0.000023 -0.000017
(0.00031) (0.0000073) (0.000019) (0.000014) (0.000033) (0.000041) (0.000044)
Disasters t-2 0.060 0.0013 0.0027 0.000098 -0.00019 -0.0072 -0.0035
(0.077) (0.00090) (0.0023) (0.0016) (0.0041) (0.0051) (0.0055)
Conflict t-2 0.40∗ -0.0089∗ 0.0010 -0.021∗∗ -0.0076 0.0069 -0.013
(0.23) (0.0052) (0.013) (0.0095) (0.024) (0.029) (0.032)
Openness score t-2 -0.012∗∗∗ -0.000089 -0.00024 -0.000086 -0.00063 0.00012 -0.0028∗∗∗
(0.0039) (0.00011) (0.00028) (0.00020) (0.00050) (0.00063) (0.00068)
Log(GDP per capita)t-2 -0.31 -0.097∗∗∗ 0.042 -0.043 -0.079 0.039 -0.24∗∗
(0.79) (0.019) (0.044) (0.033) (0.080) (0.098) (0.11)
Democracy score t-2 0.071 -0.0017 -0.00066 -0.0021 -0.0062 -0.019∗∗∗ -0.0077
(0.047) (0.0011) (0.0029) (0.0021) (0.0053) (0.0066) (0.0073)
Arable land t-2 0.62 -0.0057 -1.15∗∗ 0.27 1.22 0.95 -0.63
(6.16) (0.17) (0.45) (0.30) (0.77) (0.97) (1.03)
Log(US economic aid)t-2 -0.044 0.00016 -0.0011 -0.00035 -0.00086 0.00028 0.0028
(0.041) (0.00048) (0.0012) (0.00084) (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0029)
L.log(Animal Prod) 0.76∗∗∗
(0.087)
L.log(Fruits Prod) 0.81∗∗∗
(0.13)
L.log(Vegetables Prod) 0.51∗∗∗
(0.14)
L.log(Oilseeds Prod) 0.55∗∗∗
(0.13)
L.log(Tobacco Prod) 0.48∗∗∗
(0.18)
L.log(Cotton Prod) 0.49∗∗∗
(0.14)
Observations 3531 3406 3406 3406 3406 3406 3406
Standard errors in parentheses
Notes: An observation is a country and a year. The sample includes 118 recipient countries from 1961-2006.
All regressions include country fixed effects and year fixed effects.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 17: Robustness Tests without Outliers and Other Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NoRussia NoSouthVietnam FStage 2SLS AB
Log(cereal aid)t-1 -0.014∗ -0.015∗ -0.074∗∗ -0.014∗
(0.0078) (0.0080) (0.034) (0.0081)
L.ln_CerealsProduct_1 0.13∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.14∗∗
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065)
Log(population)t-1 0.47∗∗ 0.46∗∗ 2.19 1.10∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗
(0.21) (0.21) (1.35) (0.19) (0.21)
Deviation precip 0.00016∗∗∗ 0.00016∗∗∗ -0.00043 0.00013∗∗∗ 0.00016∗∗∗
(0.000024) (0.000025) (0.00029) (0.000049) (0.000025)
Disasters t-2 0.00014 0.00093 0.024 0.0049 0.00093
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.047) (0.0057) (0.0030)
Conflict t-2 -0.0013 -0.0032 -0.083 -0.074∗∗ -0.0027
(0.017) (0.017) (0.31) (0.037) (0.017)
Openness score t-2 0.00014 0.00014 0.00045 -0.00030 0.00013
(0.00036) (0.00037) (0.0038) (0.00048) (0.00037)
Log(GDP per capita)t-2 0.047 0.049 -3.17∗∗∗ -0.059 0.051
(0.065) (0.065) (0.64) (0.13) (0.066)
Democracy score t-2 -0.0076∗∗ -0.0079∗∗ 0.049 0.0097 -0.0079∗∗
(0.0038) (0.0038) (0.061) (0.0071) (0.0038)
Arable land t-2 -0.064 -0.055 19.4∗∗∗ 1.95∗∗ -0.084
(0.55) (0.56) (6.04) (0.85) (0.56)
Log(US_economic_aid)t-2 -0.000079 -0.000083 0.23∗∗∗ 0.017∗ -0.00014
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.023) (0.0090) (0.0016)
Observations 3394 3406 3531 3531 3406
Standard errors in parentheses
Notes: An observation is a country and a year. The sample includes 118 recipient countries from 1961-2006.
All regressions include country fixed effects and year fixed effects.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 18: Effects of Food aid on Domestic Wheat Price
(1) (2)
Prices LowIncome_Before1990
Log(cereal aid)t-1 -0.14 -0.017∗
(0.222) (0.0097)
Log(population)t-1 4.93∗ 0.66
(2.520) (3.073)
Deviation precip -0.00025 0.00031
(0.000571) (0.000904)
Disasters t-2 -0.048 -0.088
(0.113) (0.115)
Conflict t-2 -0.84 -0.98∗
(0.641) (0.595)
Openness score t-2 -0.0047 -0.0065
(0.0155) (0.0131)
Log(GDP per capita)t-2 3.63 -1.34
(4.521) (1.700)
Democracy score t-2 -0.13 0.037
(0.164) (0.0375)
Arable land t-2 -9.78 13.6
(21.71) (20.94)
Log(US_economic_aid)t-2 -0.17 0.047
(0.245) (0.101)
Observations 1903 347
Standard errors in parentheses
Notes: An observation is a country and a year. The sample includes 118 recipient countries from 1961-2006.
All regressions include country fixed effects and year fixed effects.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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